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Abstract 
We provide evidence of negative information spillovers associated with delistings from 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A delistings), a key factor in the long-term decline in the number 
of publicly listed firms in the U.S. Specifically, we show that M&A delistings are associated 
with a decrease in the quality of analysts’ information environment (increased absolute 
forecast errors and dispersion) for targets’ industry peer firms; these results are stronger when 
targets are larger, and for public targets than for private targets. Additional tests, including a 
falsification test using non-completed M&As, suggest that our results are robust to 
endogeneity concerns arising from industry-level shocks. 
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1.  Introduction  
Since 1996, the number of publicly listed firms in the U.S. has decreased sharply. Doidge, Karolyi, 
and Stulz (2017) report that, at their peak in 1996, U.S. stock exchanges had 8,025 domestic listed firms, 
but by 2012 the number had dropped to 4,102 ⎯ the decreasing trend has continued since (see Table 1). 
While firms delist for various reasons, mergers and acquisitions (M&As)⎯hereafter “M&A delistings” 
⎯are a major contributing factor to this trend.1 The reduction in the number of publicly listed firms in the 
U.S. is in sharp contrast with the growth in the overall size, i.e., total market capitalization, of public equity 
markets over this time period (Doidge et al. 2017; Mauboussin, Callahan, and Majd 2017). Public equity 
markets today are therefore characterized by a much smaller number of larger-sized firms than was the 
case just two decades ago. While concerns have been raised regarding the possible negative consequences 
of this trend for the U.S. capital markets and economy (e.g., Jensen 1997; Ljungqvist, Persson, and Tåg 
2016; Fontenay 2017; The Economist 2017), to date there is little empirical evidence showing that this 
trend has had any negative spillover effects within U.S. capital markets. Our study aims to fill this gap in 
the literature, specifically by providing evidence that M&A delistings are associated with negative 
information spillovers in U.S. capital markets. 
Documenting negative spillover effects in U.S. capital markets from the long-term trend of 
delistings due to M&As is obviously challenging due to the large number of other changes in the structure 
of U.S. capital markets over the last two decades. Given this challenge, we focus instead on whether there 
are relatively short-term (i.e., a few quarters) negative information spillover effects to other firms in the 
same industry (hereafter, “industry peer firms”) as the acquired firm that delists due to M&A.2 The 
                                                          
1  A delisting is when a firm ceases to be publicly traded on an exchange and stops providing public financial 
disclosures in compliance with the requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). M&As are 
the major cause of delistings: Doidge et al. (2017) report that between 1996 and 2012, roughly 60% of delistings 
are due to M&As. Delistings can also result from firms going private or when firms no longer meet listing standards. 
Deregistrations by going dark are a distinctly different type of transaction: this is where a firm ceases to provide 
public disclosures in compliance with SEC requirements, but continues to be publicly traded on pink sheets.  
2  Because we are interested in the spillover effects to firms in the same industry as the target firm delisting due to an 
M&A, we define industry as the target firm’s industry. The acquirer may be in the same industry (horizontal merger) 
or in a different industry (conglomerate merger) as the target firm. In cross-sectional analyses, we examine the 
effect of the different types of mergers (horizontal or conglomerate) on the spillover effects to industry peer firms. 
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delisting of a public target firm through acquisition will reduce available information about the target’s 
industry (see Badertscher, Shroff, and White 2013), possibly leading to negative information spillover 
effects for industry peer firms. By documenting negative information spillovers to industry peer firms in 
the quarters following an M&A delisting, we provide evidence that speaks to the potential negative 
spillover effects for the broader U.S. capital markets resulting from the long-term trend of a decreasing 
number of listed firms in the U.S. Our focus is therefore distinctly different from much of the prior M&A 
literature. While a large body of literature has examined the market for corporate control and various 
characteristics of M&As,3 this literature focuses on the properties of the acquiring firm or the combined 
firm. In contrast, our focus is on the other firms in the same industry as the target firm that are not directly 
involved in the M&A transaction. Specifically, we focus on how possible information spillover effects of 
M&A delistings negatively impact the information environment of industry peer firms.  
To examine whether M&A delistings result in negative spillovers to industry peer firms, we test 
whether M&A delistings are associated with a deterioration in the quality of analysts’ information 
environment for industry peer firms. Properties of analysts’ forecasts are widely used as a proxy for the 
overall quality of a firm’s information environment (e.g., see Lang and Lundholm 1996; Harford, Jiang, 
Wang, and Xie 2018). Specifically, we test whether M&A delistings are associated with significant 
increases in both analysts’ absolute forecast errors and forecast dispersion for industry peer firms. 
Using M&A delistings between 2001 and 2016, we identify a sample of 859 industry-quarters 
with at least one M&A delisting. Our sample consists of “event quarters” with one or more M&A delisting 
in an industry. We define industries using the target firm’s eight-digit Global Industry Classifications 
                                                          
3 Much of the prior literature in corporate finance that addresses the M&A setting focuses on various aspects of the 
market for corporate control. As such, the focus is more on the acquirer firm, its management (Roll 1986; 
Malmendier and Tate 2008), motives for acquisition (Nguyen, Yung, and Sun 2012), corporate governance 
(Masulis, Wang, Xie 2007), wealth effects, synergy (Hoberg and Phillips 2010), and the success of the resulting 
combined firm in both the short-run (merger announcements) and long-run (Jensen and Ruback 1983; Andrade, 
Mitchell, and Stafford 2001; Li 2013). The focus of our study is different, however. We examine the effect of M&A 
delistings on industry peer firms that are not directly involved in the M&A transaction. 
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Standard (GICS) code.4 This sample of M&A delisting event quarters is matched with IBES data for 
analysts’ earnings forecasts for industry peer firms (i.e., other firms in the same industry as the delisted 
firm) to measure analysts’ absolute forecast errors and dispersion for industry peer firms in both the pre- 
(quarters q‒6 to q‒1) and post- (quarters q+2 to q+7) M&A delisting periods, where quarter q is the event 
quarter.  
Consistent with industry peer firms experiencing negative information spillovers associated with 
M&A delistings, we find that between the pre- and post-M&A delisting periods, industry peer firms 
experience significant increases in both analysts’ absolute forecast errors and dispersion. Further, we find 
that these results are significantly stronger when the delisted firm is larger in size relative to its industry. 
We include fixed effects for each industry peer firm-delisting event quarter pairing, which controls for any 
time-invariant unobservable firm characteristics of both the industry peer firm and the delisted firm(s). We 
also include year fixed effects to control for the average effect of any trend in analysts’ information 
environment. 
There is an obvious endogeneity challenge in our setting: the possibility that an M&A transaction 
and any associated deterioration in the quality of industry peer firms’ information environment could both 
result from the same (omitted) industry-wide shock(s) (Mitchell and Mulherin 1996). Our main result, 
showing an increase in forecast errors and dispersion for industry peer firms, could therefore reflect an 
omitted industry-wide shock, and not the effects of M&A delistings per se.5 We address this endogeneity 
challenge using three different approaches. First, we examine the robustness of our results to using a 
reduced sample of M&As in which the acquirer is relatively more overvalued than the target firm; these 
are M&As that are more likely driven by acquirers’ firm-level market timing incentives, and therefore are 
less likely attributable to industry-wide shocks (see Rhodes–Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan 2005, 
                                                          
4 GICS codes classify firms by their product market; Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes classify firms by 
their production technology. We use GICS codes in preference to SIC codes, as Bhojraj, Lee, and Oler (2003) 
show that GICS codes provide a more appropriate industry classification in capital market settings. Additionally, 
in the case of sell-side analysts, prior studies show that GICS codes better reflect analysts’ coverage choices (Boni 
and Womack 2006) and peer firm selection decisions (De Franco, Hope, and Larocque. 2015) than do SIC codes. 
5 The endogeneity challenge in our setting is a variant of the more general and well-known “reflection problem” that 
renders estimation of causal peer effects particularly challenging (see Manski 1993; Angrist 2014). 
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Shleifer and Vishny 2003; Fu, Lin, and Officer 2013; Duchin and Schmidt 2013). Using this reduced 
sample, we continue to find evidence of a significant deterioration in the quality of analysts’ information 
environment for industry peer firms following M&A delistings; these results are also stronger when the 
delisted firm is larger in size relative to its industry.  
Second, we undertake a falsification test using a sample of M&A transactions that are announced 
but never completed. In these transactions, any omitted industry-level shocks or trends giving rise to 
M&As – and also possibly increasing analysts’ uncertainty about the future operating performance of 
industry peer firms – are likely still present, but there are no negative information spillovers caused by 
M&A delistings because the merger transactions are not completed. We find no significant results for this 
falsification sample, consistent with our main results being driven by negative information spillovers from 
M&A delistings, and not endogeneity bias from omitted industry-level shocks.  
Third, using individual analysts’ forecasts for industry peer firms before and after M&A delistings, 
we conduct an analyst-level analysis. Specifically, using a sample of all analysts who follow industry peer 
firms in our sample, we compare the changes in absolute forecast errors for analysts who also followed 
the delisted firm (in the pre-M&A period) with those that did not follow the delisted firm in the pre-period. 
As these analysts are all specialists in the same industry, all are affected by industry-wide shocks that may 
drive earnings uncertainty; however, the subset of analysts who followed the delisted firm in the pre-M&A 
period are likely more severely affected by any loss of useful information spillovers than analysts who did 
not follow the delisted firm. Therefore, to the extent that our main results are driven by negative 
information spillovers (and not omitted industry-wide shocks), we should observe stronger results for the 
subset of analysts who followed the delisted firm in the pre-M&A period. Consistent with this expectation, 
we document that, when forecasting earnings for industry peer firms, analysts who also followed a delisted 
firm in the pre-M&A delisting period experience a larger increase in their absolute forecast errors than 
those analysts who did not follow the delisted firm in the pre-period. This test provides more direct 
evidence of negative information spillovers from M&A delistings. Overall, the results from our three 
different analyses mitigate concerns that our main results are attributable to a potential endogeneity bias 
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because M&A announcements and changes in analysts’ information environment for industry peer firms 
are jointly determined by unobservable industry-level shocks. 
Our main results show that M&A delistings are associated with a deterioration in the quality of 
analysts’ information environment for industry peer firms. These results could arise through (at least) two 
possible channels. First, a merger of two firms may result in changes in industry structure and competition 
(hereafter the “real effect”), which could potentially increase analysts’ uncertainty about the future 
operating performance of industry peer firms. Second, with the loss of the publicly observable share price 
and financial disclosures of the delisted firm, analysts lose potentially useful sources of information 
(hereafter, the “information effect”) for forecasting for industry peer firms. Both the real effect and 
information effect defined here could result in an increase in analysts’ uncertainty regarding the future 
operating performance of industry peer firms, resulting in an increase in analysts’ absolute forecast errors 
and forecast dispersion for industry peer firms. We undertake a number of cross-sectional analyses to 
examine the potential role of these two channels in driving our main results. 
First, as already discussed, our analyst-level results show that, among analysts forecasting 
earnings for industry peer firms across the pre- and post-M&A delisting periods, the subset of these 
analysts who also followed the delisted target firm in the pre-period have a larger increase in their absolute 
forecast errors than those who did not follow the delisted firm in the pre-period. This result is consistent 
with the information effect outlined above. If an M&A delisting primarily affects analysts through the 
information effect channel, then we would expect that analysts who previously followed the delisted firm 
in the pre-period would suffer larger negative information externalities from the M&A delisting than other 
analysts in the same industry who did not follow the delisted firm in the pre-period. On the other hand, if 
the main effect of an M&A delisting on analysts who follow industry peer firms is to increase their 
uncertainty regarding the operating performance of industry peer firms because of the potential real effects 
of an M&A, then we would expect that the subset of analysts who previously followed the delisted firm 
would be less adversely affected than other analysts. Presumably, the subset of analysts who previously 
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followed the delisted firm in the pre-period would be in a better position to anticipate any real effects of 
the M&A delisting that may affect industry competition, etc. 
Second, we compare a sample of M&As in which a public target firm is acquired (resulting in 
M&A delistings) with a sample of (similar sized) M&As in which a private target firm is acquired 
(resulting in no delisting and therefore no information effect). We find that the quality of analysts’ 
information environment for industry peers decreases following M&As with private or public targets, but 
the effect is significantly greater for public target firms.  
Third, we also compare the effect on industry peer firms when a merger takes place within the 
same industry (“horizontal” mergers) vs. across industries (“conglomerate” mergers). In a horizontal 
merger, the real effects on industry peer firms are likely stronger than in a conglomerate merger, in which 
the acquirer is in a different industry from the industry peer firms (Fee and Thomas 2004). Consistent with 
the presence of increased uncertainty from potential real effects, we document that our results are stronger 
for horizontal mergers than conglomerate mergers, but the results are still significant for conglomerate 
mergers. In summary, our cross-sectional analyses provide evidence consistent with both potential 
channels – real and informational – contributing to the overall negative spillovers associated with M&A 
delistings. The results for our analyst-level analysis and our public vs. private target firm comparison both 
provide evidence consistent with the information effect channel contributing to our main results. 
Consistent with negative spillovers from the loss of public disclosures by the delisted firm, our results 
indicate that M&A delistings are associated with negative information externalities for other firms in the 
same industry.   
Finally, we examine and rule out two alternative possible explanations for our results arising from 
analysts’ and peer firms possible reactions to an M&A delisting. First, if analysts react to an M&A delisting 
by reducing their coverage of industry peer firms between the pre- and post-M&A delisting periods, this 
could result in a deterioration in the quality of analysts’ information environment for industry peer firms. 
Inconsistent with this conjecture, however, we find that there is a significant increase in analyst coverage 
for industry peer firms after an M&A delisting in the same industry. Second, our results could also be 
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attributable to a reaction on the part of peer firms to the M&A delisting; specifically, industry peer firms 
could react to an M&A delisting in the same industry by reducing the quality and/or quantity of their own 
financial disclosures⎯possibly because of proprietary cost/competition considerations (see Verrecchia 
2001). Any such reduction in peer firms’ own financial disclosures obviously presents another alternative 
possible explanation for our results. However, inconsistent with this alternative explanation, we find that 
industry peer firms significantly increase the frequency of their management forecasts, a key voluntary 
financial disclosure provided by firms, between the pre- and post-M&A delisting periods.  
Our study contributes to the limited literature on the consequences of the trend of a decreasing 
number of publicly listed firms in the U.S. Roughly 60% of all delistings over the last several decades are 
due to M&A transactions (Doidge et al. 2017); our results provide new evidence regarding the possible 
negative consequences of M&A delistings. While this study focuses on the relatively short-run (few 
quarters) effects around M&A delistings, and individual M&A delistings may have relatively small effects, 
the cumulative effect of all M&A delistings over the last two decades could be substantial. 
Our results also contribute to the M&A literature. Consistent with spillovers to industry peer firms, 
prior studies document a positive stock price response by industry peer firms to the announcement of 
horizontal takeovers (see Eckbo 1983; Fee and Thomas 2004; Shahrur 2005; Servaes and Tamayo 2014). 
In contrast, our results provide new evidence of negative spillovers from M&A transactions that increase 
uncertainty for for industry peer firms. Consistent with publicly listed firms generating positive 
information externalities for other firms in the same industry (Badetscher et al. 2013; Shroff, Verdi, and 
Yu 2014), our results also indicate that industry peer firms experience negative information externalities 
from a decrease in the number of listed firms in the same industry. Our results also show that as industry 
specialists (Piotroski and Roulstone 2004; Boni and Womack 2006) who facilitate intra-industry 
information spillovers (Piotroski and Roulstone 2004), analysts are negatively affected when there is a 
decrease in the number of peer firms in an industry.  
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the background of our 
research setting and discusses the development of our hypotheses. Sections 3 and 4 explain our research 
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design and sample selection. Section 5 discusses our main results; Section 6 analyzes and rules out two 
alternative explanations of our results. Section 7 discusses additional evidence regarding the robustness of 
our results; the paper concludes with Section 8. 
2.  Background, Literature Review, and Research Question 
2.1 Background and Literature Review  
The last two decades have seen a sharp decline in the number of publicly listed firms in the U.S. 
capital markets. Doidge et al. (2017) document that this trend is largely due to: (1) M&A delistings, and 
(2) a dearth of IPOs (Gao, Ritter, and Zhu 2013). Table 1 outlines data for the number of publicly listed 
firms in the U.S. over the period 2000 to 2017; columns (3) and (4) show the number of IPOs and M&A 
per year over the period 2000-2017. The decline in the number of listed firms over this period reflects, in 
part, the fact that the market for corporate control has become more active, with increased levels of M&A 
activity, than in previous time periods.  
Consistent with Doidge et al. (2017), Table 1 shows that, over this time period, the number of 
publicly listed firms in the U.S. declined from 6,096 to 3,440 firms. 6 This implies that, over this time-
period, the average number of listed industry peer firms for U.S. firms has decreased. Column (2) of Table 
1 confirms that, across eight-digit GICS codes, the median number of listed firms in an industry has 
decreased from 96 in 2000 to 43 in 2017, a 55% decline. This large decline is also widespread across 
industries: of the 106 eight-digit GICS industry codes with available data to measure the number of 
industry peer firms over this period, the number of listed firms declined in 92 of these 106 industries (see 
Appendix). However, the overall size of U.S. capital markets, as measured by the total market 
capitalization of all publicly listed firms, has not declined markedly over this time period. As a result, the 
                                                          
6  The number of listed firms from Table 1 varies slightly from those reported in Doidge et al. (2017), based on the 
data reported by World Development Indicators and World Federation of Exchanges. Table 4 of Doidget et al. 
(2017) reports the numbers as 6,962 in 1996 and 3,566 in 2012 using data downloaded from CRSP/Compustat. In 
terms of sampling method, Table 1 in this paper reports the number of listed firms that are comparable to those in 
Table 4 of Doidge et al. (2017); Table 1 of this paper reports the number of listed firms in 2012 as 3,579.  
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average size of listed firms has increased from approximately $2bn in 2000 to $2.7bn in 2017 (see column 
(5) of Table 1). 
< Insert Table 1 About Here > 
While there has been a very large and widespread decline in the number of listed firms in the U.S. 
over the last two decades, and a consequential decline in the average number of listed industry peers, we 
know very little about the effects of this trend on U.S. capital markets. Identifying the effects of this trend 
is challenging. Given the large number of other structural and regulatory changes in U.S. capital markets 
over the relatively long time period, it would be very difficult to separate the effects of M&A delistings 
from other market changes. As a result, in this study, we focus on the relatively short-run (i.e., few 
quarters) effects of M&A delistings on the information environment of other publicly-listed firms in the 
same industry as the target firm (industry peer firms). As mentioned already, M&A delistings are a key 
factor contributing to the long-term decline in the number of publicly listed firms in the U.S. (Doidge et 
al. 2017); evidence regarding the short-run spillover effects of M&A delisting can therefore shed some 
light on the possible longer-term consequences of the decline in the number of listed firms in the U.S. 
We examine the effect of M&A delistings on the quality of analysts’ information environment for 
industry peer firms. Sell-side analysts are a key group of information intermediaries who process and 
interpret publicly available information (Lang and Lundholm 1996) and act as monitors in capital markets 
(Yu 2008; Chen, Harford, and Lin 2015; Guo, Pérez-Castrillo, and Toldrà-Simats 2019). When forecasting 
earnings for a firm, analysts likely use all publicly available information regarding the industry, including 
information from the share prices and public disclosures of other firms in the same industry. Analysts also 
specialize by industry (Boni and Womack 2006) and facilitate the pricing of industry-level information 
(Piotroski and Roulstone 2004). Given their industry focus, sell-side financial analysts provide an ideal 
setting to detect any negative information spillovers to industry peer firms that may result from M&A 
delistings.  
2.2  Hypothesis Development 
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There are two primary reasons why we expect that M&A delistings may result in a deterioration 
in the quality of analysts’ information environment for industry peer firms. First, an M&A transaction may 
cause changes in industry structure and competition. Prior studies report that industry peer firms 
experience positive abnormal returns upon the announcements of horizontal mergers in the same industry 
(Eckbo 1983; Fee and Thomas 2005; Shahrur 2005). There could be a number of reasons for this effect: 
(1) industry peer firms might benefit from the decrease in competition resulting from a merger, (2) an 
acquisition might improve industry efficiency, and (3) the acquisition might increase the probability that 
the industry peer firms themselves become targets (Song and Walking 2000). Servaes and Tamayo (2014) 
provide evidence that industry peer firms respond to the control threat posed by other firms in the same 
industry experiencing a hostile takeover attempt by altering their own investment and financing policies. 
In addition, an unsuccessful merger might present industry peer firms with a competitive advantage. 
Finally, using data on the quality and price of goods sold, Sheen (2014) provides evidence that horizontal 
mergers result in an increase in price competition for industry peer firms.  
As industry experts, analysts may be able to anticipate many of these changes in industry structure 
and competition, i.e., real effects, stemming from an M&A in the industry they follow. However, analysts 
may not be able to correctly anticipate all of the potential real effects stemming from an M&A; and, as a 
result, may not be able to correctly incorporate all of the potential real effects into their forecasts for 
industry peer firms. After an M&A in the same industry, analysts may face increased uncertainty when 
forecasting the future operating performance and earnings of industry peer firms of the target firm. This 
increased uncertainty stems directly from potential real effects arising from an M&A. Such an increase in 
uncertainty will be reflected, ex post, in a deterioration in the quality of analysts’ earnings forecasts (i.e., 
increased absolute forecast errors and forecast dispersion) for industry peer firms.  
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Second, prior studies show that there are significant information spillovers among listed firms in 
the same industry.7 Prior to an M&A delisting, industry peer firms can benefit from information spillovers 
from the target firm. After completion of an M&A, the acquired firm stops trading, so it no longer has a 
publicly observable share price, which aggregates investors’ beliefs about the firm’s future prospects. 
Additionally, the delisted firm no longer provides stand-alone financial disclosures as required by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).8 As a result, in the post-M&A delisting period, industry peer 
firms lose potentially useful sources of information.9 Financial analysts will no longer be able to use the 
share price or financial disclosures of the delisted firm as a source of useful information when forecasting 
earnings for industry peer firms. We expect this information effect stemming from an M&A delisting⎯the 
loss of useful information spillovers from the delisted firm⎯will also result in a deterioration in the quality 
of analysts’ information environment for industry peer firms.  
On the other hand, there are also reasons to suspect that M&A delistings may not result in negative 
information spillovers for industry peer firms. First, since analysts are industry specialists (Piotroski and 
Roulstone 2004; Boni and Womack 2006), any effects of an M&A delisting on industry structure and 
competition may be relatively easy for analysts to anticipate, resulting in relatively little deterioration in 
the quality of their information regarding industry peer firms. Second, any loss of useful information from 
the delisted firm likely relates to industry-level information. Analysts may be able to use their industry 
knowledge to identify alternative sources of industry-level information to substitute for any lost 
information spillovers. Third, if targets are smaller firms that are acquired by larger public firms, then 
                                                          
7  A substantial body of literature on “information transfers” shows that public disclosures (e.g., earnings 
announcements) by one firm are associated with information spillovers to other firms in the same industry (e.g., 
Foster 1981). 
8  Of course, after acquiring another public firm, the merged firm will provide public disclosures. If the acquired firm 
becomes an operating segment of the merged firm, then there will be summary financial information available for 
the acquired firm post-acquisition. However, these disclosures will be substantially less than was the case in the 
pre-acquisition period (when the acquired firm produced stand-alone financial disclosures). Therefore, there will 
still be a substantial decrease in public disclosures for the acquired firm.   
9  In the U.S., firms with securities (debt or equity) listed on an exchange⎯i.e., public firms⎯fall under the 
jurisdiction of the SEC. The SEC mandates that these firms make numerous public disclosures. In constrast, firms 
that do not have securities listed on an organized exchange⎯i.e., private firms⎯face no such public disclosure 
requirements.  
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changes in industry structure and competition may be slight, and any decrease in useful information 
spillovers to industry peer firms may be negligible or non-existent. Finally, larger firms have higher quality 
information environments than smaller firms. An M&A transaction that consolidates two smaller firms 
into one larger firm that attracts more analyst coverage, media attention, etc. may result in a new merged 
firm that can serve as an enhanced source of intra-industry information spillovers that enhances the overall 
industry information environment for peer firms (Badertscher et al. 2013). In conclusion, it is an open 
empirical question as to whether M&A delistings are associated with negative information spillovers to 
industry peer firms. Our first hypothesis, stated in the alternative form, is therefore: 
H1:  M&A delistings are associated with a deterioration in the quality of analysts’ information 
environment for industry peer firms. 
Prior to delisting, not all delisted firms are likely to be equally important in terms of their impact 
on other firms in the same industry. The acquisition of a firm that is large in size relative to its industry is 
likely to result in larger real effects, i.e., larger effects on industry structure and competition, and therefore 
potentially larger increases in uncertainty regarding the future operating performance of industry peer 
firms. Additionally, larger firms have a richer information environment than smaller firms and serve as a 
greater source of new market- and industry-wide information and, as a result, trigger more information 
spillovers to other firms (Bonsall, Bozanic, and Fischer 2013).10 An M&A delisting of a larger firm can 
therefore result in larger information effects for industry peer firms. An M&A delisting involving a larger 
firm can thus result in larger real and informational effects for industry peer firms; therefore, our second 
hypothesis, stated in the alternative form, is: 
H2:  There is a larger deterioration in the quality of analysts’ information environment for industry 
peer firms when the delisted firm is larger in size relative to its industry. 
3.  Research Design 
                                                          
10  Larger firms are followed by more investors (O’Brien and Bhushan 1990), covered by more sell-side analysts 
(Bhushan 1989; Harford, Jian, Wang, and Xie 2018), provide more extensive disclosures (Lang and Lundholm 
1993), and attract more media attention (Miller 2006). Larger firms also tend to have smaller spreads (Roll 1984), 
indicating lower levels of information asymmetry than is the case for smaller firms. 
13 
 
3.1 Measuring the Quality of Analysts’ Information Environment for Industry Peer Firms  
Similar to prior studies (e.g., Lang and Lundholm 1996; Byard, Li and Yu 2011), as our measure 
of the overall quality of analysts’ information environment for industry peer firms, we use analysts’ 
absolute forecast errors and forecast dispersion for earnings forecasts. Consistent with these studies, we 
expect that increased uncertainty about a firm will adversely affect the quality of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts, resulting in larger absolute forecast errors and forecast dispersion.  
3.2 Defining the Pre- and Post-M&A Delisting Periods  
We first select a sample of public firms that delist due to M&As. Using this data, we construct a 
sample of industry-quarters with one or more M&A delisting(s). This provides a sample of M&A delisting 
“event-quarters,” i.e., industry-quarters in which there is a decrease in the number of listed firms in an 
industry due to at least one M&A. Industry is defined using eight-digit GICS codes. These M&A delisting 
event-quarters are matched with IBES analysts forecast data for industry peer firms for the fiscal quarters 
around these event-quarters. The event quarter, q, is defined as the first fiscal quarter in which the delisted 
firm no longer releases a quarterly financial statement. We then define the pre-M&A delisting period as 
the six-quarter period that precedes quarter q, i.e., fiscal quarters q‒6 to q‒1; similarly, we define the post-
M&A delisting period as the six-quarter period following the completion of the M&A delisting transaction, 
i.e., fiscal quarters q+2 to q+7. We leave a two-quarter gap between the pre- and post-M&A delisting 
periods [q, q+1] because some mergers take more than three months to complete.11 Finally, we merge this 
sample of industry peer firm-quarters with IBES data for analysts’ earnings forecasts to measure analysts’ 
absolute forecast errors and forecast dispersion for industry peer firms in both the pre- (quarters q‒6 to q‒
1) and post- (quarters q+2 to q+7) M&A delisting periods. This provides for a sample of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts for industry peers for the periods six quarters before and after an M&A delisting event quarter. 
3.3 Research Design 
                                                          
11 M&As are excluded if it takes more than 6 months from end of the last fiscal quarter in which the firm released a 
quarterly report. This restriction results in 4 M&A delisting transactions being dropped from our sample. 
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We test H1 and H2 using the following model: 
ForecastErr or Dispersion = β1PostMergerm,i + β2PostMergerm,i × CMSm,i  
                                                 + X’B + Σ βm,iMDm×Peeri + Σ βtYeart + ε . (1) 
We estimate Equation (1) using a sample of peer firm-quarters that span both the pre- (q‒6 to q‒1) and 
post- (q+2 to q+7) M&A delisting periods. For ease of exposition, we drop the time (quarter) subscripts 
in Equation (1) and subsequent equations. To measure our dependent variables, we first use the IBES detail 
file to select the last forecast of quarterly earnings issued by each individual analyst in the quarter before 
an earnings announcement. Using these forecasts, we then calculate our two dependent variables: (1) 
ForecastErr is the absolute value of the difference between actual EPS from IBES and the median of these 
individual earnings forecasts, scaled by share price at the beginning of the quarter, and (2) Dispersion is 
the standard deviation across these individual quarterly earnings forecasts, scaled by share price at the 
beginning of the quarter.  
MDm is a set of indicator variables coded one (zero) for each M&A delisting event quarter m. Peeri 
is a set of indicator variables coded one (zero) for each industry peer firm i (≠ i). Equation (1) includes a 
set of fixed effects for each delisting event quarter m and industry peer firm i pair (i.e., MDm×Peeri). This 
fixed effect structure controls for the effect of any unobservable time-invariant (i.e., that are common in 
both pre- and post-M&A delisting period) firm characteristics of both the industry peer firms and firm(s) 
that delist in that event-quarter, such as CMS. We also include a set of year fixed effects: Yeart is coded 
one for year t, or zero otherwise. 
 For our test of H1, the variable of interest is PostMergerm,i which is an indicator variable coded 
one if a firm-quarter observation for a peer i is in the post-M&A delisting period [q+2, q+7] of an M&A 
delisting event-quarter m, and zero if it is in the pre-M&A delisting period [q‒6, q‒1]. The coefficient on 
PostMergerm,i, β1, can be interpreted as the incremental effect of an M&A delisting on ForecastErr or 
Dispersion of an industry peer firm in the post-M&A delisting period relative to the pre-M&A delisting 
period; note, the level of ForecastError or Dispersion is captured by the fixed effect MDm×Peeri. From 
H1, we test the prediction that β1 > 0.   
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We use the interaction variable PostMerger×CMSm,i to test H2. Capital Market Share (CMS) 
measures the relative importance of a firm in its industry, and is defined as the delisted firm’s market 
capitalization at the end of the last quarter in which it issued its last quarterly financial report, scaled by 
the market capitalization of all firms in the same industry at the end of that quarter. For delisting event 
quarter m, CMSm measures the fraction of total industry market capitalization represented by the firm(s) 
that delisted in event quarter m. Larger values of CMS indicate that the delisted firm represents a relatively 
larger presence in its industry. The coefficient on the interaction term PostMerger×CMS therefore 
identifies the incremental impact on the quality of analysts’ information environment of industry peer 
firms when there is a relatively larger delisting in the same industry. From H2 we test the prediction that 
β2 > 0.12 We do not have a similar prediction for the effect of acquirer firm size.13 Nevertheless, as an 
additional analysis, we also examine cross-sectional variation in our results driven by variation in the size 
of the acquiring firm (measured as CMS of the acquirer).  
We also include a set of control variables for firm characteristics of the industry peer firms, in 
order to control for any changes in firm characteristics or analysts’ forecasting behavior for peer firms 
between the pre- and post-M&A delisting periods. Specifically, X is a vector of control variables, where 
X = {log(avgDays), log(Coverage), log(MktValq-1), log(MTB), log(Volume), IndRet}, where avgDays is 
the average number of days between analysts’ forecast issue dates and earnings announcement date for 
peer firm i; Coverage is the number of analysts who forecast for peer firm i; MktValq-1 is the market 
valuation of peer firm i at the beginning of a quarter; MTB is the market-to-book ratio of equity of peer 
firm i; Volume is the trading volume of peer firm i during the current quarter; IndRet is the value-weighted 
industry return of an industry, classified by eight-digit GICS codes, during the current quarter. This 
                                                          
12 Note, we do not include the stand-alone variable CMS in our regression model as CMS is a firm characteristic of 
the delisted firm, and the regression model already includes a set of fixed effects for each pairing of an industry 
peer firm and delisted firm(s). 
13  A larger acquiring firm may signal greater potential competitive challenges for industry peer firms, possibly 
leading to greater “real effects” for industry peer firms in the case of horizontal mergers. On the other hand, there 
is no reason to expect a larger information effect when the acquiring firm is larger, as the acquiring firm will 
continue to provide public financial disclosures after the M&A. Further, since the acquiring firm is likely to be 
larger than the target firm, the public financial disclosures of the larger acquiring firm will not change as much as 
a result of the M&A.   
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controls for changes in important firm-level determinants of analysts’ forecast accuracy and dispersion, or 
changes in analysts’ forecasting behavior, for industry peer firms between the pre- and post-M&A delisting 
periods. log(avgDays) and log(Coverage) are analyst-level control variables; log(MktValq-1), log(MTB), 
and log(Volume) are firm-level control variables, and IndRet is an industry-level control variable.  
3.4 Addressing the Endogeneity Challenge 
 Identifying causal peer effects is challenging because of the well-known “reflection problem” (see 
Manski 1993; Angrist 2014). In a general sense, the reflection problem refers to the endogeneity challenge 
that arises when one tries to identify whether a group characteristic (e.g., industry membership) affects 
actions or outcomes for members of the group. This leads to a particular omitted variable endogeneity 
problem. Firms that are part of the same group⎯e.g., the same industry⎯will share many common (latent) 
economic characteristics and, as a result, will be exposed to similar shocks. In our research setting, the 
omitted variable endogeneity challenge arises from the possibility that M&A activities can result from 
industry-wide technology or demand shocks (Mitchell and Mulherin 1996; Harford 2005), which might 
also affect the level of earnings uncertainty for industry peer firms. For example, an industry-wide 
technology shock could increase the likelihood of an M&A transaction in an industry and, at the same 
time, increase uncertainty about the future operating performance of all firms in the industry, including 
industry peer firms that are not involved in the M&A transaction. Such an industry-wide shock could result 
in an M&A delisting in an industry and also increased uncertainty regarding the future operating 
performance and earnings of industry peer firms, potentially resulting in a deterioration in the quality of 
analysts’ information environment for industry peer firms. As a result, an increase in analysts’ absolute 
forecast errors and dispersion for industry peer firms could be driven by the same (omitted) industry-wide 
shock(s) that caused the M&A transaction, and not be driven by the M&A delisting per se; hence, our 
identified negative spillover effects from M&A delistings may be affected by an omitted variable 
endogeneity bias. 
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 We address this endogeneity challenge using three distinct tests. First, we select a sub-sample of 
M&A delistings that are less likely driven by industry-wide shocks, i.e., a subset of M&As that are more 
likely driven by acquirers’ market timing incentives. Second, we undertake a falsification 
test⎯specifically, we examine M&As that are announced but never completed. We expect that in this 
setting, any industry-wide shocks that drive M&A are present, but because the M&A is not completed and 
there is no delisting, any real and information effects that are caused by the M&A delisting are not present. 
Third, we conduct an analyst-level test, which we argue is less sensitive to the specific endogeneity bias 
arising from potentially omitted industry-level shocks. 
As our first approach to tackle the endogeneity issue, we alter our sample selection procedures to 
use a sub-sample of M&A delistings, which we argue are less exposed to possible omitted industry-level 
shocks that may cause an M&A. M&A transactions can result from industry-wide technology or demand 
shocks (Harford 2005). However, M&A transactions can also be driven by firm-specific factors, such as 
acquiring firms’ market timing incentives (Shleifer and Vishny 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan 
2004). When an acquiring firm is more over-priced than a target firm, i.e., the acquirer has access to 
cheaper equity financing, the acquiring firm has a stronger incentive to swap its own relatively over-priced 
stock for that of the target firm. Thus, when the acquirer is over-priced relative to the target firm, the M&A 
transaction is more likely to be driven by the market timing incentives of the acquiring firm, a firm-specific 
factor, and is less likely attributable to industry-wide shocks. With this in mind, we identify a reduced 
sample of M&A delistings in which the acquiring firm is overvalued relative to the target firm (Rhodes-
Kropf et al. 2005; Fu, Lin, and Officer 2013).14 We test whether our results are robust to using this reduced 
sample of M&A delistings that are more likely attributable to acquiring firms’ market timing incentives.  
As our second approach to address the endogeneity challenge, we undertake a falsification test. 
Specifically, we exploit M&A transactions that are announced, but subsequently not completed, as a 
setting to conduct a falsification test for our main tests. M&As that are announced but not completed are, 
                                                          
14 See also Schleifer and Vishny (2003) and Gu and Lev (2011). 
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presumably, exposed to industry-wide shocks that may cause M&A transactions. However, since the 
transaction is not completed, there is no increase in analysts’ uncertainty resulting from any real or 
information effects caused by the M&A per se. A sample of non-completed M&A transaction therefore 
provides an ideal setting to undertake a falsification test for our main test outlined above.  
Finally, our third empirical approach to address the endogeneity challenge arising from the effect 
of potential omitted industry-level shocks is to undertake an analyst-level analysis. This test exploits the 
fact that analysts specialize by industry, so presumably, all analysts specializing in an industry are affected 
by the same industry-wide shocks. However, within the pool of analysts specializing in an industry, some 
follow the delisted firm in the pre-M&A delisting period, while others do not. Therefore, using a sample 
of analysts’ forecasts for industry peer firms across the pre- and post-M&A delisting periods, we compare 
analysts who also covered the delisted firm in the pre-M&A delisting period with those who did not cover 
the delisted firm. Those analysts who covered the delisted firm are presumably more affected by any loss 
of useful information spillovers than are other analysts; however, we can think of no reason why different 
analysts covering the same industry would be differently affected by factors endogenously driving M&A, 
based on whether or not they covered the delisted firm. For this reason, to the extent that our main results 
are driven by negative information spillovers (and not omitted industry-level shocks), we should observe 
a greater increase in forecast errors for analysts who also followed the delisted firm in the pre-M&A 
delisting period. 
4.  Sample Selection  
4.1 Selection of Our Full and Reduced Samples 
 Using data from CRSP, we first identify a sample of 3,407 U.S. M&A delistings (DLSTCD 
between 200 and 399) over the period 2001 to 2015. We delete observations with missing Compustat data 
for GICS codes, fiscal quarter year-end data, and missing acquirer data in SDC, resulting in a sample of 
1,327 unique M&A delistings. From this sample of 1,327 M&A delistings, we identify 859 unique 
industry-quarters with at least one M&A delisting in an industry (eight-digit GICS code). Of these 859 
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unique industry “event quarters” with one or more M&A delisting(s) in an industry, we can identify data 
for industry peer firms available in both the pre- and post-M&A delisting periods for 838 of these event 
quarters. These 838 event quarters are evenly distributed over the sample period 2001 to 2015, with no 
obvious clustering by year. Following the approach in Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005), from this full sample 
of 838 M&A delisting event-quarters, we identify a reduced sample of 363 M&A delisting event-quarters 
consisting of M&A delistings in which the acquirer firm is more over-valued than the target firm.15  
< Insert Table 2 About Here > 
 Table 2 describes our sample selection procedures. We match our full (reduced) sample of 838 
(363) delisting event-quarters with (1) IBES data to measure analysts’ absolute forecast errors and 
dispersion for industry peer firms [i.e., other firms in the same eight-digit GICS code as the delisted 
firm(s)] in both the pre- and post-M&A delisting periods. Panel B of Table 2 shows that, for these 838 
(363) delisting event-quarters, the full (reduced) sample consists of data for 273,920 (110,564) firm-
quarter observations for industry peer firms across the pre- (quarters q‒6 to q‒1) and post- (quarters q+2 
to q+7) M&A delisting periods. 
5.  Main Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis 
 Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for our full sample of 273,920 firm-quarter observations. Mean 
ForecastErr (Dispersion) is 0.584 (0.279), which is consistent with that reported in prior studies (e.g., 
Byard et al. 2011). The descriptive statistics also show that our sample industry peer firms tend to be large: 
mean market capitalization is $4.9bn, with average analysts following of 8.7 analysts. Finally, consistent 
                                                          
15 We form a subsample consisting of M&A transactions that are more likely to be motivated by firm-specific 
incentives such as market timing based on investors’ mispricing (Shleifer and Vishny 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan 2004); a setting in which the acquirer is more over-valued than the target firm. Rhodes-Kropf, 
Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) decompose market mispricing (market-to-book) into three components: the 
firm specific, the sector-wide, and short-run deviation from the long-run pricing. Using this approach, we identify 
363 M&A transactions in which the acquirer’s firm-specific component of mispricing is higher than that of the 
target firm. 
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with both M&A activity and analyst coverage being skewed more towards high growth industries, the 
mean market-to-book ratio for our sample industry peer firms is 5.057.  
 Figure 1 plots the mean values of ForecastErr and Dispersion for industry peer firms across the 
pre- and post-M&A delisting periods for our full sample of 273,930 M&A delisting-peer-quarter 
observations. To clarify, M&A delistings are completed between quarters q and q+1. As can be seen in 
Figure 1, consistent with a deterioration in the overall quality of analysts’ information environment for 
industry peer firms, we see that there is a pronounced increase in both ForecastErr and Dispersion in the 
post-M&A delisting period relative to the pre-M&A delisting period.  
< Insert Table 3 and Figure 1 About Here > 
5.2 Main Results 
 Our main results from estimating Equation (1) for ForecastErr and Dispersion using both our full 
and reduced samples of M&A delisting event quarters are shown in Table 4. Using the full sample, 
consistent with the prediction of H1, the results show that PostMerger is significantly positively associated 
with both ForecastErr and Dispersion (p<0.01, two-tailed, for both), confirming that, on average, the 
quality of analysts’ information environment for industry peer firms deteriorates in the post-M&A 
delisting period relative to the pre-M&A delisting period. Consistent with the prediction of H2, we also 
find a significant positive coefficient on the interaction term PostMerger×CMS for both ForecastErr and 
Dispersion (p<0.05 or better, two-tailed, for both). That is, when a relatively larger target firm delists as a 
result of an M&A, there is a greater deterioration in the quality of analysts’ information environment for 
industry peer firms. In additional analyses, we also examine if the size of acquiring firms (CMS for the 
acquirer firm) is related to the magnitude of the change in the quality of analysts’ information environment 
for industry peer firms; the untabulated results of this analysis are not statistically significant at 
conventional levels. 
< Insert Table 4 About Here > 
5.3 Analyses to Address Endogeneity Challenge  
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5.3.1 Reduced Sample of M&A Delistings More Likely Driven by Acquirer Market Timing 
Our first empirical approach for addressing the endogeneity concern arising from the possible 
impact of omitted industry-level shocks is to use a sample of M&A delistings that are less likely driven by 
industry-level shocks. Table 4 shows that the results are unchanged using a reduced sample of M&A 
delistings that are more likely attributable to acquirer market timing incentives, a firm-specific incentive, 
and therefore are less likely driven by industry-wide shocks. Using this reduced sample, consistent with 
the predictions of H1 and H2, we find significant positive coefficients on both PostMerger (p<0.01, two-
tailed) and the interaction term PostMerger×CMS (p<0.05 or better, two-tailed) for both ForecastErr and 
Dispersion. These results mitigate concerns that our results arise because the quality of analysts’ 
information environment for industry peer firms and M&A delistings are both jointly determined by some 
unobservable industry-level shock(s).  
5.3.2  A Falsification Test Using Non-Completed M&A Announcements 
As our second approach to address the endogeneity challenge in our setting, we conduct a 
falsification test using a sample of M&A that are announced, but not completed. If an M&A is announced, 
but not completed, we expect that the industry peer firms will still experience any underlying industry 
shocks that may have given rise to the M&A attempt. However, because the M&A is not completed, the 
industry peer firms do not experience any increase in earnings uncertainty caused by (1) any real effects 
resulting from actual structural changes in the industry caused by the M&A per se, or (2) any information 
effects from the loss of useful information spillovers from the delisted firm.  
< Insert Table 5 About Here > 
 Using the same sample selection procedures used to construct our main sample, we identify a 
sample of 107 industry quarters in which an M&A is announced and not completed. For these 107 non-
completed M&A announcements, we measure ForecastErr and Dispersion for 22,194 industry peer firm-
quarters that straddle both the pre- and post-M&A announcement periods (see endnotes of Table 5 for 
details). Table 5 shows the results from re-estimating Equation (1) using this sample of data for industry 
peer firms around a set of non-completed M&As. As can be seen in Table 5, the results of this analysis are 
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not reliably statistically significant (none of the results are significant at the 5% level). These results 
provide further evidence indicating that our main findings are not attributable to endogeneity bias arising 
because M&A announcements and changes in analysts’ information environment for peer firms are jointly 
determined by unobservable industry-level shocks. 
5.3.3 Analyst-Level Test 
Our third set of analyses to address the endogeneity concern uses a sample of individual analysts’ 
earnings forecasts for industry peer firms that are made by analysts who cover the industry peer firms in 
both the pre- and post-M&A delisting periods. Specifically, we compare changes in analysts’ forecast 
errors (for industry peer firms) for analysts who did vs. those who did not cover the delisted firm in the 
pre-M&A delisting period.   
We include a set of fixed effects for merger-peer-analyst groups, which means that we are able to 
compare analysts who covered the delisted firm with other analysts in the same industry who did not cover 
the delisted firm. If negative information spillovers are one of the primary factors driving the increase in 
analysts’ absolute forecast errors (and dispersion) documented in our main results, we expect that analysts 
who followed the delisted firm in the pre-M&A delisting period should experience a larger increase in 
their absolute forecast errors for industry peer firms compared to other analysts who also forecast earnings 
for industry peer firms, but who did not follow the delisted firm in the pre-M&A delisting period.  
< Insert Table 6 About Here > 
In Table 6, the variable AnalystDelisted is coded as one if an analyst released a forecast for the 
delisted firm during the pre-M&A delisting period, and zero otherwise. The variable of interest is the 
interaction term PostMerger×AnalystDelisted; we predict a positive coefficient on this interaction term, 
indicating that, in their forecasts for industry peer firms, analysts who covered the delisted firm (in the 
pre-period) experience a greater increase in forecast errors after the M&A delisting than analysts who did 
not cover the delisted firm. Consistent with this expectation, in Table 6, the coefficient on 
PostMerger×AnalystDelisted is positive and significant at the 1% level. Since both analysts follow firms 
in the same industry, presumably they are exposed to the same industry-level shocks; however, the analysts 
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who also covered the delisted firm in the pre-M&A period are presumably more exposed to a negative 
“information shock” from the delisting. Taken together, the results of our three different tests to address 
the endogeneity challenge suggest that our main results are not attributable to a possible endogeneity bias 
arising from the potential effects of omitted industry-level shocks. 
5.4 Real vs. Information Effects 
 As explained earlier, the information environment of an industry may be negatively affected by 
an M&A delisting through both real and information effects. As our study focuses on the information 
effects, we perform three tests to ascertain that our results are, at least in part, attributable to information 
effects: (1) our analyst-level test described earlier; (2) a comparison of public vs. private targets; and (3) a 
comparison of horizontal vs. conglomerate mergers. 
5.4.1 Analyst-Level Test 
As already discussed, the results in Table 6 show that, in their forecasts for industry peer firms, 
there is a significantly larger increase in forecast errors (for industry peer firms) for those analysts who 
previously also followed the delisted firm (in the pre-period) than for other analysts. This shows that, when 
forecasting earnings for industry peer firms, analysts who previously also followed the delisted firm are 
more adversely affected by the M&A delisting event. This result is more consistent with the “information 
effect” channel than the “real effect” channel. If an M&A delisting primarily affects analysts forecasting 
earnings for industry peers via real effects, then we would expect that the subset of those analysts who 
previously also followed the delisted firm should be less adversely affected by the M&A delisting than 
other analysts. Presumably, those analysts who previously followed the delisted firm would be in a better 
position to anticipate any changes in industry structure and competition (i.e., real effects) that may follow 
from the M&A. Because of this, we would expect to see a smaller increase in forecast errors for these 
analysts (than for other analysts). On the other hand, if an M&A delisting primarily affects analysts 
forecasting earnings for industry peers via information effects, then it follows that the subset of analysts 
who previously also followed the delisted firm in the pre-period should be more adversely affected by the 
M&A delisting. In this case, one would expect that, for forecasts of industry peer firms, there should be a 
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larger increase in forecast errors for those analysts who previously also followed the delisted firm in the 
pre-period (because this subset of analysts experiences a larger negative information externality than other 
analysts). The results for our analyst-level analysis are therefore more consistent with the information 
effect channel and provide evidence that the information effect channel contributes to the overall negative 
spillovers associated with M&A delistings. 
5.4.2 Public vs. Private Target Firms  
As another test to provide evidence as to the separate contribution of the real and information 
effects in driving the overall negative spillovers associated with M&A delistings, we also compare M&As 
involving public with those involving private target firms. In Table 7 we compare the change in the quality 
of analysts’ information environment for industry peer firms around M&As in which a public target firm 
is acquired (i.e., resulting in delistings) with a sample of M&As in which a private target firm is acquired 
(and there is no delisting). If the delisting itself ⎯and the accompanying loss of the delisted firm’s share 
price and public financial disclosures⎯has negative information spillover effects on industry peer firms, 
then we expect to observe a greater deterioration in analysts’ information environment for industry peer 
firms when the target firm is public rather than private.  
To construct our sample, we start with our initial sample of M&A delistings—which represent 
public target firms—and add to it a sample of M&As involving private target firms over the same time 
period. For this analysis, we must first modify our definition of industries to use SIC rather than GICS 
codes, as private firms do not have data for GICS codes.16 Second, because private targets tend to be 
smaller on average, than public target firms, we include M&As with private targets that are not too small 
or too large relative to public targets. To do so, we restrict the sample to: (1) M&As for private targets in 
which the estimated firm value of the private target (deal value/percent of shares acquired) is equal to or 
greater than the minimum market value of all public target firms over the sample period, and (2) M&As 
                                                          
16 This is why our initial sample of M&As with public targets is significantly smaller in Table 5 than in Table 4. 
Additionally, we impose size restrictions on our sample of public vs. private target M&As as explained above. 
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for public targets in which the target firm value is equal to or smaller than the maximum of the estimated 
firm values for private target firms over the sample period. We also eliminate industries with only public 
or private target firms. This ensures that the public and private target firms are comparable, in terms of 
size and industry.17 Using this sample, we compare the spillovers to industry peer firms from M&As 
involving public targets with those involving private targets. We use the following model:  
ForecastErr or Dispersion = β1PostMergerm,i + β2PostMergerm,i×PublicTargetm,i  
                                                 + X’B + Σ βm,iMDm×Peeri + Σ βtYeart + ε , (2) 
where PublicTarget is an indicator variable coded one (zero) when the M&A involves a public (private) 
target firm. The results of this comparison are reported in Table 7. PostMerger=0 for pre-period (quarters 
q‒6 to q‒1) and 1 for the post-period (quarters q+2 to q+7).  
Table 7 shows that the coefficient on PostMerger is positive and significant (p<0.01, two-tailed, 
for both), indicating that there are negative information spillovers to industry peers from M&As in the 
same industry, whether or not such an M&A results in a delisting. This is consistent with some of our main 
results being attributable to the real effects, i.e., increased uncertainty induced by possible structural or 
competition changes resulting from an M&A. We also find a positive and significant coefficient on 
PostMerger×PublicTarget (p<0.05, two-tailed, for both), indicating that there is a larger decrease in the 
quality of analysts’ information environment for industry peer firms following M&As involving public 
target firms (and hence a delisting) than private target firms. Consistent with negative information 
externalities from a delisting in the same industry, these results indicate that there are incremental negative 
spillover effects on the information environment of industry peer firms when an M&A in the same industry 
also involves a delisting.  
< Insert Table 7 and 8 About Here > 
5.4.3 Horizontal vs. Conglomerate Mergers  
                                                          
17 As an alternative, we also use an entropy-balancing approach to match our private and public target firm samples 
on size and industry (two-digit SIC); the results using this alternative matching approach are similar. 
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Next, we compare the effect on industry peer firms of horizontal (HMerger=1) vs. conglomerate 
mergers (HMerger=0) using the following model: 
ForecastErr or Dispersion = β1PostMergerm,i + β2PostMergerm,i × HMergerm,i  
                                                 + X’B + Σ βm,iMDm×Peeri + Σ βtYeart + ε . (3) 
In horizontal mergers, the acquirer and target firms are in the same industry, and therefore the effects on 
industry structure and competition are likely stronger⎯there are larger real effects⎯than in a 
conglomerate merger, in which the acquirer and target firms are in different industries (Fee and Thomas 
2004). Consistent with this argument, in Table 8, the coefficient on the interaction term 
PostMerger×HMerger is positive and significant (p<0.05, for both), indicating that the deterioration in 
the quality of analysts’ information environment for industry peer firms is significantly greater for 
horizontal mergers than for conglomerate mergers. However, the results are still significant for 
conglomerate mergers. In summary, the results reported in Tables 6-8 suggest that both real and 
information effects are present and contribute to our main results reported in Table 4. The results for our 
analyst-level analyses (Table 6) and our comparison of M&As involving public vs. private target firms 
(Table 7) provide evidence supporting the information effect channel, indicating that  M&A delistings 
result in negative information externalities for industry peer firms. 
6.  Ruling out Alternative Explanations 
 In addition to an omitted variable problem, the reflection problem can also lead to a simultaneity 
issue in peer effects studies. Members of a group⎯in this case firms in an industry⎯are likely to react to 
and influence each other’s decisions. Our dependent variables are measures of the quality of analysts’ 
information environment for industry peer firms. A concern in our setting therefore is the possibility that 
either the analysts who follow the peer firms, or the peer firms themselves, may strategically react to an 
M&A delisting in the same industry and, as a result, alter their behavior in a way that leads to a decrease 
in the observed quality of analysts’ information environment for the industry peer firms. That is to say, 
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our main results may not be driven by M&A delisting per se but, rather, by peer firms’ (or the analysts 
who cover peer firms) reactions to M&A delisting. We examine both of these possibilities. 
6.1  A Decrease in Analyst Coverage for Industry Peer Firms 
If analysts who follow industry peer firms react to an M&A delisting by providing less effort to 
cover industry peer firms⎯thus lowering the quality of analysts’ information environment for industry 
peer firms⎯then this reaction by analysts may provide an alternative explanation for our main results. 
Such a reaction by analysts would be reflected in a drop in analyst coverage for industry peer firms in the 
post-M&A delisting period relative to the pre-M&A delisting period. In our main analysis using 
ForecastErr and Dispersion, we include analyst coverage of peer firms, log(Coverage), as a control 
variable. Nevertheless, as an additional analysis, we also re-estimate a variation of Equation (1) using 
analyst coverage of industry peer firms as the dependent variable. Inconsistent with this alternative 
possible explanation, the untabulated results show that there is a statistically significant increase in analyst 
coverage of industry peer firms between the pre- and post-M&A delisting periods.18 
6.2  A Decrease in Public Disclosure by Industry Peer Firms 
A second key simultaneity issue in our setting is the possibility that the industry peer firms react 
to the M&A delisting by altering their own public disclosures. The quality of analysts’ information 
environment is positively related to the quality of firms’ public disclosures (Lang and Lundholm 1996). A 
second alternative explanation for our main findings is therefore the possibility that industry peer firms 
react to M&A delistings by strategically reducing the quality and/or quantity of their own public 
disclosures, possibly because of competitive effects.19 We directly test for this possibility next. Using data 
                                                          
18 These results may be mechanical and, as a result, we do not include this analysis as part of our main results. The 
increase in analyst coverage for industry peer firms could arise because those analysts that cover the industry (and 
previously covered the delisted firm) may be re-assigned to cover other firms in the same industry, thus increasing 
the coverage of industry peer firms.  
19 There could be a number of reasons why industry peer firms may choose to alter their disclosure policies in 
response to an M&A delisting in the same industry. First, since the delisting will decrease the aggregate supply of 
information about the industry, industry peer firms may choose to increase their own disclosures to compensate 
for the resulting increase in uncertainty (see Baginski and Hinson 2016). Second, if the M&A delisting has 
competitive effects within the industry, then this may change peer firms’ disclosure incentives. The potential effect 
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from IBES/First Call, we test whether there is a decrease in industry peer firms’ management forecasts, a 
key voluntary financial disclosure provided by firms, between the pre- and post-delisting periods. 
Specifically, we test whether there is a change in the frequency with which industry peer firms provide 
management forecasts between the pre- and post-delisting periods. Table 9 reports the results from 
estimating the following model: 
log(MForeFreq) = β1PostMergerm,i + X’B + Σ βm,iMDm×Peeri + Σ βtYeart + ε, (4) 
where MForeFreq is the number of management forecasts issued (including forecasts of earnings, cash 
flows, sales, etc.) by an industry peer firm in each quarter. As in our main analysis, X is a vector of control 
variables for firm characteristics associated with the issuance of management forecasts (e.g., see Lang and 
Lundholm 1996). For Equation (4), X = {log(Issue), log(MTB), RetVol, log(Coverage), log(MktValq-1)}. 
Issue is defined as the sum of net equity issuances and debt issuances (Compustat variables (SSTKQ- 
PRSTKCQ + DLTISQ)/ATQ); the other control variables are also used in our estimates of Equation (1) 
and are therefore previously defined. Equation (4) includes the same paired fixed effects previously used 
in our estimates of Equations (1) – (3). The variable of interest is PostMerger, which measures the change 
in the frequency with which peer firms issue management forecasts between the pre- and post-M&A 
delisting periods. 
< Insert Table 9 About Here > 
The results from estimating Equation (4) for our full and reduced samples are shown in Table 9. 
Using our full sample, we find a significant positive coefficient on PostMerger, indicating that peer firms 
significantly increase (p<0.05, two-tailed) the frequency with which they issue their management forecasts 
in the post-M&A delisting period relative to the pre-M&A delisting period. The coefficient on PostMerger 
is not statistically significant in our reduced sample. In sum, our analysis of the change, between the pre- 
                                                          
of delisting on industry competition and, hence, peer firms’ disclosure incentives, are complex and difficult to 
predict in aggregate (see Verrecchia 2001). Nevertheless, we acknowledge that it is possible that in aggregate, the 
competitive effects of M&A delisting may be to decrease peer firms’ incentives to provide disclosures. If true, this 
would result in peer firms providing less disclosure in the post-delisting period relative to the pre-delisting period.  
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and post-M&A delisting periods, in a key voluntary disclosure provided by peer firms provides no support 
for the alternative possible explanation for our main results⎯that industry peer firms decrease their 
disclosures between the pre- and post-M&A delisting periods.  
 
7.  Robustness 
7.1 Industries Represented in the Sample 
 In untabulated analyses, we verify that our results are robust to excluding financial and utilities 
firms. Our main analysis is industry-based in which we define a firm’s industry using GICS codes. In 
untabulated analyses, we verify that our results are robust to using SIC codes as an alternative definition 
of firms’ industry.  
7.2 Overlapping M&A Delisting Transactions in the Same Industry 
In our full (reduced) sample tests, we use a sample of 838 (363) event quarters in which there are 
one or more M&A delistings in a particular industry. For these event quarters, we then measure and 
compare the quality of analysts’ information environment across a pre-M&A delisting period, defined as 
quarters q‒6 to q‒1, and a post-M&A delisting period, defined as quarters q+2 to q+7. A key concern in 
our study design is the possibility of an effect from overlapping M&A transactions in the same industry. 
Intuitively, if there is a second M&A delisting in the same industry in the pre-M&A delisting period, this 
may further reduce the quality of analysts’ information environment for industry peer firms, thus biasing 
against our results. On the other hand, a second M&A delisting in the same industry that occurs in the 
post-M&A delisting period may reduce the quality of analysts’ information further in the post-period 
relative to the pre-period, with the result that we over-estimate the effect of an individual M&A transaction 
on the quality of analysts’ information environment for industry peer firms. 
< Insert Table 10 About Here > 
To assess the impact of any such potential biases from overlapping event periods in our sample, 
we re-estimate our main model, including additional indicator variables to control for periods in which 
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there is an additional M&A delisting event in the same industry in either the pre- or post-M&A delisting 
periods used in our study. The results of this additional analysis are reported in Table 10. As can be seen 
in Table 10, our main results are robust to including additional controls for the potential effect of 
overlapping M&A delisting events in the same industry.  
7.3 Measuring the Pre- and Post-M&A Delisting Period and Scaling 
 In our main analysis, we use a six-quarter pre- and post-M&A delisting periods. We verify that 
our inferences are unchanged using four-quarter pre- and post-M&A delisting periods. Further, in our main 
analysis, we use price-scaled absolute forecast errors and dispersion. We verify that our inferences are 
unchanged using unscaled absolute forecast error and dispersion, or using alternative scaling variables 
(e.g., total assets per share). 
8.  Conclusion 
In this study, we document that M&A delistings are associated with a significant decline in the 
quality of analysts’ information environment of industry peer firms, as measured by an increase in 
analysts’ absolute forecast errors and dispersion; these results are stronger when the delisted firm is larger 
relative to its industry, and for public vs. private target firms. These results do not appear to be attributable 
to endogeneity bias arising from omitted industry-wide shocks. First, our results hold for transactions in 
which the acquirer is overvalued relative to the target, and therefore the M&A is more likely driven by 
acquirer market timing incentives (Shleifer and Vishny 2003, Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan 2004), 
rather than industry-wide shocks (Harford 2005). Second, we find no significant results in a falsification 
test using a sample of non-completed M&A announcements. Third, in an analyst-level analysis, we find 
that in forecasts for industry peer firms, there is a larger increase in forecast errors for those analysts who 
previously followed the delisted firm in the pre-M&A delisting period compared with other analysts 
forecasting earnings for the same industry peer firms but who did not follow the delisted firm in the pre-
M&A delisting period. This analyst-level analysis is plausibly less exposed to endogeneity bias from 
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omitted industry-level shocks since all analysts that follow firms in the same industry should be similarly 
affected by any common industry-level shocks.  
Our main results are consistent with industry peer firms experiencing negative information 
externalities from M&A delistings. First, our analyst-level analysis points to lost information spillovers 
from the delisted firm adversely affecting analysts who previously covered the delisted firm. Second, we 
find that the deterioration in the quality of analysts’ information environment of industry peer firms is 
significantly larger for public targets than for private target firms. Finally, we also document that our 
results are stronger for horizontal mergers, but still significant for conglomerate mergers.  
Our results provide new evidence that industry peer firms experience negative information 
externalities associated with M&A delistings. Since M&A delistings are one of the main causes of the 
long-term trend of a declining number of publicly listed firms in the U.S. (Doidge et al. 2017), our results 
also provide new evidence of negative consequences for U.S. capital markets from the trend of a declining 
number of publicly-listed firms in the U.S.20 Our results also contribute to the M&A literature: specifically, 
our results provide new evidence of negative spillovers to the broader capital markets from M&A. 
Consistent with information spillovers/externalities in capital markets (Badertscher et al. 2013; Shroff et 
al. 2014), our results point to negative information spillovers from a decrease in the number of listed firms 
in an industry. Additionally, our results show that, as information intermediaries that specialize by industry 
(Boni and Womack 2006), sell-side analysts are negatively affected by a loss of industry firms resulting 
from M&A delistings in the same industry.   
   
                                                          
20 Doidge et al. (2017) show that the decreasing number of listed firms in the U.S. is attributable to both: (1) delistings 
due to M&As and (2) a relative dearth of IPOs. Our results only speak to negative externalities from (1) and 
provide no evidence as to the consequences of (2). 
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Appendix 
Industry Distribution of our Sample 
 
  2000  2017  ∆ (%) 
GICS  Listed 
Firms 
Mkt. Cap. Firm 
Size 
 Listed 
Firms 
Mkt. Cap. Firm 
Size 
 Listed 
Firms 
Mkt. Cap. Firm 
Size 
  (A) (B) (C) 
= B/A 
 (D) (E) (F) 
= E/D 
 (G) 
= (D-A)/A 
(H) 
= (E-B)/B 
(I) 
= (F-C)/C 
45205010 Semiconductor Equipment 56 118,560 2,117         
45204010 Office Electronics 7 14,913 2,130         
40401010 Real Estate Investment Trusts 1 11 11         
45201010 Networking Equipment 63 743,219 11,797         
20201040 HR & Employment Svcs. 40 22,050 551         
45202010 Computer Hardware 34 677,189 19,917         
20201020 Data Processing Services 30 164,104 5,470         
45205020 Semiconductors 101 760,687 7,532         
30202020 Meat Poultry & Fish 9 11,712 1,301         
40201010 Consumer Finance 50 143,729 2,875         
45202020 Comp. Storage & Peripherals 75 298,177 3,976         
25202020 Photographic Products 6 18,531 3,089         
40401020 Real Estate Mngmt. & Dvpmt. 42 12,573 299         
25502010 Catalog Retail 26 16,315 627         
20201030 Divsf. Cmmrcl. & Prof. Svcs. 151 146,128 968         
40101010 Diversified Banks 720 1,306,057 1,814  5 1,246,694 249,339  −99% −5% 13645% 
40201020 Other Diversified Fin. Svcs. 99 1,185,913 11,979  1 8,508 8,508  −99% −99% −29% 
35102010 Health Care Distributors 131 151,192 1,154  8 87,560 10,945  −94% −42% 848% 
25203030 Textiles 19 2,518 133  3 1,115 372  −84% −56% 181% 
50102010 Wireless Tele. Svcs. 45 183,018 4,067  8 87,385 10,923  −82% −52% 169% 
50101020 Integrated Tele. Svcs. 69 844,722 12,242  14 460,693 32,907  −80% −46% 169% 
25201050 Housewares & Specialties 27 26,017 964  6 18,874 3,146  −78% −28% 226% 
15104020 Diversified Metals & Mining 18 15,963 887  4 3,484 871  −78% −78% −2% 
25401040 Publishing 48 165,856 3,455  11 22,457 2,042  −77% −87% −41% 
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45203010 Elec. Eqpmt. & Instruments 198 195,319 986  46 68,460 1,488  −77% −65% 51% 
25504020 Computer & Electronics Retail 17 28,968 1,704  4 20,020 5,005  −77% −31% 194% 
25201040 Household Appliances 17 18,415 1,083  4 14,438 3,610  −77% −22% 233% 
25504040 Specialty Stores 96 78,925 822  23 54,271 2,360  −76% −31% 187% 
10102010 Integrated Oil & Gas 11 663,112 60,283  3 649,357 216,452  −73% −2% 259% 
45102010 IT Consulting & Other Svcs. 115 107,156 932  32 268,870 8,402  −72% 151% 802% 
25501010 Distributors 28 2,126 76  8 33,759 4,220  −71% 1488% 5459% 
25503020 General Merchandise Stores 23 375,448 16,324  7 80,894 11,556  −70% −79% −29% 
45101010 Internet Software & Services 347 351,927 1,014  108 1,495,432 13,847  −69% 325% 1265% 
45103010 Application Software 248 350,170 1,412  78 452,203 5,797  −69% 29% 311% 
25401010 Advertising 36 68,927 1,915  12 28,853 2,404  −67% −58% 26% 
25203020 Footwear 21 25,986 1,237  7 113,399 16,200  −67% 336% 1209% 
10101010 Oil & Gas Drilling 21 68,072 3,242  7 16,396 2,342  −67% −76% −28% 
30101030 Food Retail 29 103,887 3,582  10 29,652 2,965  −66% −72% −17% 
25202010 Leisure Products 55 24,809 451  19 37,733 1,986  −66% 52% 340% 
25401020 Broadcasting 57 369,839 6,488  20 66,292 3,315  −65% −82% −49% 
20304010 Railroads 14 56,351 4,025  5 210,620 42,124  −64% 274% 947% 
30202010 Agricultural Products 19 18,050 950  7 36,061 5,152  −63% 100% 442% 
45201020 Communications Equipment 148 592,090 4,001  55 304,445 5,535  −63% −49% 38% 
55102010 Gas Utilities 32 87,888 2,746  12 47,301 3,942  −63% −46% 44% 
30201010 Brewers 8 68,962 8,620  3 20,269 6,756  −63% −71% −22% 
20104010 Elec. Components & Eqpmt. 93 146,216 1,572  37 119,784 3,237  −60% −18% 106% 
20201060 Office Services & Supplies 36 34,840 968  15 16,755 1,117  −58% −52% 15% 
15101020 Diversified Chemicals 12 134,086 11,174  5 196,399 39,280  −58% 47% 252% 
55101010 Electric Utilities 67 516,504 7,709  28 475,091 16,968  −58% −8% 120% 
25203010 Apparel, Acces. & Luxury 
Gds. 
63 29,705 472  27 97,999 3,630  −57% 230% 670% 
40301020 Life & Health Insurance 39 179,902 4,613  17 219,923 12,937  −56% 22% 180% 
15103010 Metal & Glass Containers 18 10,227 568  8 43,936 5,492  −56% 330% 867% 
30101010 Drug Retail 9 101,021 11,225  4 147,758 36,939  −56% 46% 229% 
45103020 Systems Software 75 685,403 9,139  34 1,027,257 30,213  −55% 50% 231% 
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20302010 Airlines 22 64,117 2,914  10 148,756 14,876  −55% 132% 410% 
25504030 Home Improvement Retail 11 174,202 15,837  5 265,255 53,051  −55% 52% 235% 
35102030 Managed Health Care 24 97,825 4,076  11 450,920 40,993  −54% 361% 906% 
20304020 Trucking 48 26,301 548  22 69,588 3,163  −54% 165% 477% 
25201020 Home Furnishings 26 16,503 635  12 33,805 2,817  −54% 105% 344% 
25301010 Casinos & Gaming 45 32,801 729  21 124,877 5,947  −53% 281% 716% 
20201010 Commercial Printing 17 9,778 575  8 10,603 1,325  −53% 8% 130% 
25301020 Hotels, Resorts & Cruise 
Lines 
27 28,140 1,042  13 113,677 8,744  −52% 304% 739% 
15104050 Steel 45 19,423 432  22 62,393 2,836  −51% 221% 557% 
15104010 Aluminum 6 1,129 188  3 13,489 4,496  −50% 1095% 2290% 
20105010 Industrial Conglomerates 12 765,876 63,823  6 441,429 73,571  −50% −42% 15% 
40301010 Insurance Brokers 12 65,918 5,493  6 61,137 10,190  −50% −7% 85% 
35102020 Health Care Facilities 44 94,394 2,145  22 62,683 2,849  −50% −34% 33% 
25101020 Tires & Rubber 4 7,453 1,863  2 9,560 4,780  −50% 28% 157% 
15105010 Forest Products 6 21,519 3,586  3 6,460 2,153  −50% −70% −40% 
25401030 Movies & Entertainment 37 316,973 8,567  19 336,774 17,725  −49% 6% 107% 
25101010 Auto Parts & Equipment 62 49,029 791  32 69,173 2,162  −48% 41% 173% 
25503010 Department Stores 13 76,042 5,849  7 22,273 3,182  −46% −71% −46% 
20201050 Env. & Facilities Svcs. 48 39,699 827  26 93,210 3,585  −46% 135% 333% 
50101010 Alternative Carriers 20 52,674 2,634  11 37,873 3,443  −45% −28% 31% 
25102010 Automobile Manufacturers 9 103,060 11,451  5 168,478 33,696  −44% 64% 194% 
25301040 Restaurants 95 121,486 1,279  54 325,048 6,019  −43% 168% 371% 
25502020 Internet & Direct Mkt. Retail 42 25,945 618  24 794,897 33,121  −43% 2964% 5262% 
35101010 Health Care Equipment 185 306,707 1,658  107 571,295 5,339  −42% 86% 222% 
30101020 Food Distributors 12 34,555 2,880  7 46,324 6,618  −42% 34% 130% 
15105020 Paper Products 17 63,465 3,733  10 12,470 1,247  −41% −80% −67% 
15103020 Paper Packaging 15 21,976 1,465  9 84,443 9,383  −40% 284% 540% 
40301050 Reinsurance 5 13,988 2,798  3 19,400 6,467  −40% 39% 131% 
15101040 Industrial Gases 5 23,384 4,677  3 80,291 26,764  −40% 243% 472% 
30202030 Packaged Foods & Meats 73 212,668 2,913  44 420,768 9,563  −40% 98% 228% 
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30302010 Personal Products 37 95,763 2,588  23 76,606 3,331  −38% −20% 29% 
20106020 Industrial Machinery 122 113,318 929  76 320,378 4,215  −38% 183% 354% 
40301040 Property & Casualty Insurance 72 352,746 4,899  45 223,379 4,964  −38% −37% 1% 
25201010 Consumer Electronics 12 1,480 123  8 7,585 948  −33% 412% 669% 
20101010 Aerospace & Defense 70 280,604 4,009  47 700,611 14,907  −33% 150% 272% 
35101020 Health Care Supplies 52 18,883 363  35 76,306 2,180  −33% 304% 500% 
25201030 Homebuilding 37 25,635 693  25 89,007 3,560  −32% 247% 414% 
15101010 Commodity Chemicals 22 9,935 452  15 37,063 2,471  −32% 273% 447% 
15102010 Construction Materials 13 15,163 1,166  9 42,575 4,731  −31% 181% 306% 
20102010 Building Products 41 36,200 883  29 91,955 3,171  −29% 154% 259% 
30203010 Tobacco 9 154,931 17,215  7 305,063 43,580  −22% 97% 153% 
20303010 Marine 5 3,513 703  4 5,718 1,430  −20% 63% 103% 
20301010 Air Freight & Logistics 15 126,468 8,431  12 206,399 17,200  −20% 63% 104% 
25504010 Apparel Retail 45 98,342 2,185  37 120,125 3,247  −18% 22% 49% 
40301030 Multi-line Insurance 13 381,919 29,378  11 116,131 10,557  −15% −70% −64% 
15101050 Specialty Chemicals 48 60,709 1,265  41 211,635 5,162  −15% 249% 308% 
35202010 Pharmaceuticals 112 1,863,548 16,639  98 1,028,139 10,491  −13% −45% −37% 
10102020 Oil & Gas Expl. & Production 108 168,247 1,558  95 477,853 5,030  −12% 184% 223% 
20104020 Heavy Electrical Equipment 9 5,639 627  8 2,415 302  −11% −57% −52% 
20103010 Construction & Engineering 30 18,723 624  27 59,186 2,192  −10% 216% 251% 
15101030 Fertilizers & Agr. Chemicals 11 16,340 1,485  10 91,568 9,157  −9% 460% 516% 
25301030 Leisure Facilities 13 8,746 673  12 22,343 1,862  −8% 156% 177% 
20106010 Constr. Mach. & Heavy 
Trucks 
29 53,179 1,834  28 206,136 7,362  −3% 288% 301% 
30301010 Household Products 13 266,446 20,496  13 388,553 29,889  0% 46% 46% 
30201020 Distillers & Vintners 7 2,879 411  7 65,842 9,406  0% 2187% 2187% 
15104040 Precious Metals & Minerals 3 2,262 754  3 105 35  0% −95% −95% 
15104030 Gold 6 5,813 969  6 26,482 4,414  0% 356% 356% 
10102030 Oil & Gas Refining & Mkt. 19 26,719 1,406  20 164,774 8,239  5% 517% 486% 
10101020 Oil & Gas Equipment & Svcs. 50 102,006 2,040  54 108,006 2,000  8% 6% −2% 
55104010 Water Utilities 11 8,326 757  13 34,408 2,647  18% 313% 250% 
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30201030 Soft Drinks 10 341,532 34,153  12 426,348 35,529  20% 25% 4% 
55103010 Multi-Utilities 14 164,783 11,770  17 247,158 14,539  21% 50% 24% 
35201010 Biotechnology 210 451,485 2,150  305 902,301 2,958  45% 100% 38% 
40201030 Multi-Sector Holdings 2 497 248  3 499,706 166,569  50% 100493% 66957% 
20107010 Trading Companies & Distr. 18 17,232 957  35 103,597 2,960  94% 501% 209% 
25102020 Motorcycle Manufacturers 1 17,092 17,092  2 8,616 4,308  100% −50% −75% 
20305030 Marine Ports & Services 1 666 666  2 1,547 773  100% 132% 16% 
Some industries contain no firm as of 2017, as GICS classifications of these industries were discontinued. Further information about historical changes in GICS structure, 
as of January 2019, is available at: https://www.msci.com/gics. These discontinued GICS classifications do not affect our main analyses, as we use only firms that are 
classified as the same GICS consistently over the pre- and post-M&A delisting periods.  
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FIGURE 1 
Changes in Absolute Forecast Errors and Forecast Dispersion 
for Industry Peer Firms Around M&A Delistings 
 
This figure shows the change in analysts’ absolute forecast errors and dispersion for industry peer firms 
around M&A delistings in the same industry. This figure plots average ForecastErr and Dispersion across 
the pre- and post-M&A delisting periods for the sample of 273,920 firm-quarter observations (described in 
Table 2) for industry peer firms. The pre-M&A delisting period consists of quarters q-6 to q-1, where q=0 
is the fiscal quarter-end where a target firm stops releasing financial disclosures after the M&A. Quarters 
q and q+1 are excluded from the sample as these quarters include the period between the merger 
announcement and when shares are delisted from exchanges. The post-M&A delisting period consists of 
quarters q+2 to q+7. For each of the 273,920 fiscal quarters, using IBES data, we select the last forecast of 
one quarter ahead earnings (IBES FPI=6) issued by each analyst. We then calculate our two dependent 
variables as: ForecastErr is the absolute value of the difference between actual EPS from IBES and the 
median forecast, scaled by the share price at the beginning of the quarter; and Dispersion is the standard 
deviation of these forecasts, scaled by the share price at the beginning of the quarter. ForecastErr and 
Dispersion are averaged each quarter across all industry peer firms (firms in the same industry as the target 
firm but which are neither the target firm nor the acquirer in the M&A transaction). Industry is defined as 
the target firm’s 8-digit GICS. For any industry peer firm i in our sample, we also require that any analyst 
who forecasts earnings for firm i does so, at least once, in both the pre- and post-M&A delisting period. 
Firms with fewer than 3 quarter observations for the pre- [q−6, q−1] or post-M&A delisting period [q+2, 
q+7] are also eliminated. 
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TABLE 1 
Trend of Listed Firms 
 Counts  Dollar values in millions  
 
 
Year 
 
Listed 
Firms 
 
Median # 
of Peers 
 
# of 
IPOs1 
 
# of 
M&A 
 
Mkt. Cap. of 
Listed Firms 
Median Industry 
Mkt. Cap. 
Avg. Mkt. Value 
of a Listed Firm 
  (A)     (B) (B/A) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
2000   6,096  96 380 515  20,728,276  195,319 2,035 
2001   5,431  87 79 396  17,382,218  145,629 1,674 
2002   5,037  80 66 231  13,656,828  114,492 1,431 
2003   4,736  64 63 228  17,196,962  143,711 2,245 
2004   4,674  65 173 248  18,526,151  169,269 2,604 
2005   4,587  60 159 227  18,529,319  171,923 2,865 
2006   4,502  57 157 257  19,971,040  174,551 3,062 
2007   4,380  53 159 326  19,626,140  174,050 3,284 
2008   4,156  49 21 216  11,485,250  88,006 1,796 
2009   3,953  46 41 118  14,353,329  123,201 2,678 
2010   3,802  44 91 191  16,258,603  146,599 3,332 
2011   3,674  44 81 190  15,434,969  130,888 2,975 
2012   3,579  41 93 173  16,958,109  160,252 3,909 
2013   3,563  42 157 167  21,904,858  202,670 4,825 
2014   3,656  44 206 142  23,318,188  227,701 5,175 
2015   3,643  40 115 172  22,473,993  203,609 5,090 
2016   3,498  43 74 196  23,747,524  249,858 5,811 
2017   3,440  43 108 183  27,393,199  304,445 7,080 
1 From Jay Ritter: Initial Public Offerings: Updated Statistics 2018, available at:    
https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/ 
This table presents data showing the trends in the number of listed firms, the number of delisted firms, the median 
number of industry peer firms, and related market values over the period 2000-2017. Listed firm data are from CRSP, 
and include only common shares (share code 10 and 11) listed on Amex, NYSE, or NASDAQ. Similar to Table 3 of 
Doidge et al. (2017), we exclude firms classified as REITs (defined as SIC codes 6722, 6726, 6798, or 6799). We only 
count firms with available Compustat data. Data for delisted firms is also from CRSP, using delisting codes between 
200 and 399. The same data selection procedures for the listed firms are also applied to the data selection of delisted 
firms. 
We count the number of industry peers based on 8-digit GICS codes. For the number of peers, all firms in an 
industry are counted across firms with available market value data as of the fiscal quarter-end during the fourth 
calendar quarter (October to December). For the market capitalization of listed firms, market values of all firms are 
summed using their values as of the fiscal quarter-end during the fourth calendar quarter. Similarly, for industry market 
capitalization, market values of all firms in an industry are summed using their values as of the fiscal quarter-end 
during the fourth calendar quarter. Median values are taken from the entire firm-quarter sample during a year. All 
dollar values are adjusted to the average price level (CPI for all urban consumers) of 2017. All numbers in this table 
are based on raw data, not winsorized or trimmed data. 
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TABLE 2 
Sample Selection of M&A Delistings and Industry Peer Firms  
Panel A. Sample Selection of M&A Delistings   
Delistings over 2001-2015   5,687  
 (Delistings for cause) (2,012)  
 (Voluntary delisting) (268)  
Delistings by Merger   3,407  
 (Not matched with Compustat) (91)  
 (Not matched with acquirer data from SDC) (1,882)  
 (Not having fiscal quarter-end in March, June, September, and December) (107)  
Mergers   1,327 
 (Multiple mergers in an industry-quarter) (468)  
Number of industry-quarters with one or more M&A delisting   859 
Full Sample:        Number of industry-quarters with industry peer firms available in both 
pre- and post-merger period 
 838 
Reduced Sample: Number of industry-quarters with one or more M&A delisting in 
which firm-specific overpricing of acquirer > that for target 
 363  
 
Panel B. Sample Selection of Quarterly Observations for Industry Peer Firms 
  
Full Sample (From Panel A): Delisting “event quarters” with IBES data for listed 
industry peer firms 
 838  
Merger-peer-quarters over pre-M&A delisting period [q-6,q-1] and post-merger period 
[q+2,q+7] matched to the mergers above 
 672,386 
 (Merger-peer-analyst where an analyst follows only pre-M&A delisting or only post-
M&A delisting period) 
(88,399)  
 (Missing ForecastErr, Dispersion, or control variables) (259,635)  
 (Fewer than 3 quarters available for either the pre- and post-M&A delisting period, 
respectively, for a merger-peer) 
(50,432)  
Full Sample:        Industry peer firm quarters observations (around M&A delisting 
quarters) 
 273,920  
Reduced Sample: Industry peer firm quarters observations (around M&A delisting 
quarters) in which firm-specific overpricing of acquirer > that of target 
 110,564 
This table summarizes our sample selection procedure. Panel A summarizes the selection of our sample of M&A 
delisting “event quarters,” i.e., fiscal quarters with one or more M&A delisting(s) in a particular industry. We begin 
with 5,687 delisting events identified from CRSP during the sample period between 2001 and 2015. We categorize 
delistings into delistings for cause (firms delisted since they cannot maintain listing requirements), voluntary delistings 
(e.g., LBOs), and delistings by merger, following Doidge et al. (2017) and Fama and French (2004). Delistings with 
a CRSP delisting code (DLSTCD) 400 or higher are classified as delistings for cause, except for DLSTCD = 570 or 
573; delistings with DLSTCD = 570 or 573 are classified as voluntary delistings; delistings with DLSTCD between 
200 and 399 as delistings by merger. This yields a sample of 3,407 delistings resulting from mergers.  
We eliminate 91 delisting observations since they are not matched with Compustat data, or the gap between the 
delisting date and the last quarterly reporting date is more than 6 months; 1,882 observations with no acquirer data 
available from SDC; 107 observations with fiscal quarter-end different from March, June, September, and December. 
The final sample of delisted firms consists of 1,327 M&A delistings. From this sample of M&A delistings, we identify 
859 unique industry-quarters with one or more delistings in a particular industry. Of these 859 M&A delisting event 
quarters, there is available IBES data to measure the quality of analysts’ information environment for industry peer 
firms in the pre- and post-M&A delisting periods for 838 of these event-quarters. This constitutes our full sample. 
Using the approach of Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005), from this full sample, we identify our reduced sample of 363 M&A 
delistings event quarters composed of M&As more likely attributable to acquirer firm market timing. See Rhodes-
Kropf et al. (2005) for details of the calculation of firm-specific mispricing.  
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Panel B explains the selection of our sample of firm-quarters used to measure the quality of analysts’ information 
environment for industry peer firms. For our full sample, we match the 838 M&A delisting “event quarters” with 
financial data for all available listed industry peers over the period 6 quarters before the event quarter (pre-M&A 
delisting period) and 6 quarters subsequent to the event quarter (post-M&A delisting period). We allow a two quarters’ 
gap between the end of the pre-M&A delisting period and the beginning of the post-M&A delisting period, as it can 
take more than 6 months to complete an M&A transaction. To make sure only listed peers are included in the sample, 
only common shares (CRSP SHRCD = 10 or 11) listed on NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX (CRSP HEXCH = 1, 2, or 3) 
are retained, excluding investment funds and trusts (SIC code = 6722, 6726, 6798, or 6799). Peer-quarters included 
in the sample meet the following criteria: they have fiscal quarter-ends in March, June, September, and December; 
the firm name (CONM in Compustat) does not contain the terms “ADR”, “Holdings”, “Group”, or variations of these; 
with more than 2 quarters data available in both of the pre- and post-M&A delisting periods; where the peer is neither 
the acquired firm nor the acquirer. These restrictions result in a final usable sample of 838 M&A delistings event 
quarters, which are matched with data for 672,386 firm-quarters for industry peer firms across both the pre- and post-
M&A delisting periods.   
This firm-quarterly data for industry peer firms is then matched with IBES detailed analyst forecast data. We 
require that each analyst releases at least one forecast for a peer firm during both the pre- and post-M&A delisting 
periods. This eliminates 88,399 merger-peer-quarter observations. Further eliminated are: 259,635 observations with 
missing ForecastErr, Dispersion, or control variables; 50,432 observations for firms with fewer than 3 quarters of 
observations for the pre-M&A delisting period [q-6, q-1] or 3 quarters of observations for the post-M&A delisting 
period [q+2, q+7]. The final full (reduced) sample consists of 273,920 (110,564) firm-quarter observations for industry 
peer firms. For the reduced sample, mergers have firm-specific overpricing of the acquirer that is greater than that for 
the target, representing mergers that are more likely caused by an acquirer’s market timing rather than industry-wide 
shocks. 
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TABLE 3  
Descriptive Statistics for Full Sample 
 N Mean Std. Dev. 1st Pctl. Q1 Median Q3 99th Pctl. 
ForecastErr (%) 273,920 0.584 1.484 0.000 0.054 0.163 0.459 11.268 
Dispersion (%)  273,920 0.279 0.553 0.000 0.046 0.104 0.262 3.942 
avgDays  273,920 80.9 17.6 35.7 72.5 82.7 89.8 122.3 
Coverage  273,920 8.7 6.8 2 4 6 12 32 
MktValq-1  273,920 4,894  19,038  45  331  852  2,516  77,195  
MTB  273,920 5.057 139.624 0.371 1.342 2.101 3.601 24.250 
Volume  273,920 0.868 2.521 0.004 0.079 0.232 0.659 10.528 
IndRet  273,920 0.019 0.125 -0.356 -0.040 0.031 0.092 0.313 
This table presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in our main analyses for our full sample of 273,920 fiscal 
quarters for industry peer firms in both the pre- and post-M&A delisting periods. For each fiscal quarter in the pre- 
and post-M&A delisting periods, for the industry peer firms, using IBES data we select the last forecast of one quarter 
ahead earnings (IBES FPI=6) issued by each analyst. We then calculate our two dependent variables as follows: 
ForecastErr is the absolute value of the difference between actual EPS from IBES and the median forecast, scaled by 
share price at the beginning of the quarter; and Dispersion is the standard deviation of these forecasts, scaled by share 
price at the beginning of the quarter. avgDays is the average number of days between the forecast date and the earnings 
announcement date. Coverage is the number of analysts following the peer firm. MktValq-1 is the market value of a 
peer firm at the beginning of the quarter. MTB is the market-to-book ratio of equity of a peer firm. Volume is the 
trading volume for a peer firm summed over the quarter. IndRet is the value-weighted average returns across firms in 
an industry (eight-digit GICS code) during a quarter.  
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TABLE 4 
Main Results: Change in Analysts’ Information Environment of Industry Peer Firms Around M&A Delistings 
 Full Sample  Reduced Sample 
 Dep. var. = ForecastErr (%) Dep. var. = Dispersion (%)  Dep. var. = ForecastErr (%) Dep. var. = Dispersion (%) 
PostMerger 0.141*** 0.130*** 0.031*** 0.029***  0.185*** 0.173*** 0.046*** 0.043*** 
 (13.77) (11.86) (9.08) (7.98)  (11.46) (10.16) (8.20) (7.16) 
PostMerger×CMS 1.269***  0.255**   1.388***  0.408** 
  (3.87)  (2.19)   (2.73)  (2.35) 
Control variables:          
log(avgDays) 0.252*** 0.252*** −0.031*** −0.031***  0.264*** 0.264*** −0.029*** −0.029*** 
 (19.73) (19.72) (−6.76) (−6.76)  (12.63) (12.63) (-3.91) (−3.91) 
log(Coverage) 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.094*** 0.094***  0.083*** 0.083*** 0.089*** 0.089*** 
 (8.28) (8.25) (22.75) (22.70)  (4.58) (4.58) (13.23) (13.23) 
log(MktValq-1) ‒1.095*** ‒1.096*** ‒0.466*** ‒0.467***  ‒1.127*** ‒1.128*** ‒0.476*** ‒0.476*** 
 (‒61.64) (‒61.64) (‒71.66) (‒71.66)  (‒40.96) (‒40.97) (‒47.41) (‒47.41) 
log(MTB) 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.010* 0.010  0.059** 0.058** ‒0.000 ‒0.000 
 (4.02) (3.99) (1.66) (1.63)  (2.30) (2.29) (‒0.04) (‒0.04) 
log(Volume) 0.804*** 0.806*** 0.397*** 0.398***  0.812*** 0.810*** 0.392*** 0.392*** 
 (22.77) (22.78) (33.03) (33.03)  (14.95) (14.94) (20.44) (20.43) 
IndRet ‒0.456*** ‒0.457*** ‒0.128*** ‒0.129***  ‒0.500*** ‒0.498*** ‒0.156*** ‒0.156*** 
 (‒16.34) (‒16.35) (‒14.43) (‒14.45)  (‒11.37) (‒11.34) (‒10.97) (‒10.94) 
Firm fixed effect Merger-peer Merger-peer Merger-peer Merger-peer  Merger-peer Merger-peer Merger-peer Merger-peer 
Time fixed effect Year Year Year Year  Year Year Year Year 
Adjusted std. error Merger-peer Merger-peer Merger-peer Merger-peer  Merger-peer Merger-peer Merger-peer Merger-peer 
Adjusted R2 14.27% 14.31% 20.76% 20.80%  15.92% 15.93% 22.02% 22.02% 
# of observations 273,920 272,665 273,920 272,665  110,564 110,564 110,564 110,564 
This table presents the results of our analysis of changes in analysts’ absolute forecast errors (ForecastErr) and dispersion (Dispersion) for industry peer firms 
around M&A delistings in the same industry. ForecastErr is defined as the absolute value of the difference between actual EPS from IBES and the median forecast, 
scaled by share price at the beginning of the quarter. Dispersion is the standard deviation of forecasts, scaled by share price at the beginning of the quarter. 
PostMerger equals one if a peer-quarter observation is for forecasts made during the 6-quarter period after an M&A delisting [q+2, q+7] (zero if it is for a six-
quarter period before the merger [q-6, q-1]), where q is the quarter that the delisted firm stops issuing quarterly reports. CMS is the acquired firm’s market value at 
the end of the quarter when the acquired firm last issues a quarterly financial report, scaled by the market capitalization of the acquired firm’s industry. avgDays is 
47 
 
the average number of days between the forecast issue date and the earnings announcement date. Coverage is the number of analysts following the peer firm. 
MktValq-1 is the market value of a peer firm at the beginning of the quarter. MTB is the market-to-book ratio of equity of a peer firm. Volume is the trading volume 
of a peer firm summed over the quarter. IndRet is the value-weighted average return across firms in an industry during the quarter. Merger-peer and year fixed 
effects are included. Year fixed effects are defined using the calendar year-end of industry peer firms. Standard errors are adjusted clustering by each merger-peer. 
Data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Significance levels are based upon two-tailed p-values; 10%, 5%, and 1% are indicated by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
48 
 
 
TABLE 5 
Engodonetiy Test: Falsification using Non-Completed M&A Announcements 
 Dep. var. = ForecastErr (%) Dep. var. = Dispersion (%) 
PostMerger 0.017 0.012 −0.029* −0.030* 
 (0.39) (0.26) (−1.92) (−1.91) 
PostMerger×CMS  0.380  0.061 
  (0.50)  (0.18) 
Control variables:     
log(avgDays) 0.236*** 0.236*** 0.012 0.012 
 (5.22) (5.23) (0.80) (0.80) 
log(Coverage) 0.062 0.062 0.097*** 0.097*** 
 (1.60) (1.60) (6.35) (6.35) 
log(MktValq-1) −1.030*** −1.030*** −0.511*** −0.511*** 
 (−17.03) (−17.03) (−21.15) (−21.16) 
log(MTB) −0.039 −0.039 −0.041* −0.041* 
 (−0.71) (−0.70) (−1.70) (−1.70) 
log(Volume) 0.465*** 0.464*** 0.361*** 0.361*** 
 (4.25) (4.25) (8.90) (8.90) 
IndRet −0.259*** −0.259*** −0.092*** −0.092*** 
 (−2.67) (−2.67) (−2.98) (−2.98) 
Firm fixed effect Merger-peer Merger-peer Merger-peer Merger-peer 
Time fixed effect Year Year Year Year 
Adjusted std. error Merger-peer Merger-peer Merger-peer Merger-peer 
Adjusted R2 10.88% 10.88% 19.92% 19.92% 
# of observations 22,194 22,194 22,194 22,194 
This table presents the results of a falsification test of our main analyses reported in Table 4. For this table, the 
sample consists of firm-quarter observations for industry peer firms of target firms where an M&A is announced and 
subsequently withdrawn, i.e., a sample of non-completed M&A. Data on non-completed mergers are available in the 
SDC, which contains 1,191 non-completed merger announcements over the period between 2001 and 2015. The same 
sample selection procedures as the main sample are applied, as described in Table 2. Additionally, all industry-quarters 
that contain both a completed and a non-completed merger are excluded to avoid any confounding effects from the 
completed merger. The final sample consists of 22,194 merger-peer-quarter observations for 107 merger 
announcements that are subsequently not completed. All variables are the same as in our main analysis and are defined 
in the endnotes of Table 4. Data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Significance levels are based upon two-
tailed p-values; 10%, 5%, and 1% are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.   
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TABLE 6 
Endogeneity Test: Analysts Who Previously Followed Delisted Firms vs. Analsts Who Did Not  
 Dep. var. = ForecastErr_Analyst (%) 
 Coeff. t-stat. 
PostMerger 0.100*** (25.79) 
PostMerger×AnalystDelisted 0.039*** (6.37) 
Control variables:   
log(Days) 0.076*** (40.89) 
log(Coverage) 0.129*** (22.64) 
log(MktValq-1) -0.844*** (-118.93) 
log(MTB) 0.043*** (6.52) 
log(Volume) 0.528*** (48.11) 
IndRet -0.398*** (-34.44) 
Analyst fixed effect Merger-peer-analyst 
Time fixed effect Year 
Adjusted std. error Merger-peer-analyst 
Adjusted R2 39.34% 
# of observations 1,250,177 
This table presents the results of an analyst-level analysis. In this analysis, we consider two groups of analysts 
who follow an industry peer firm: (1) those who also followed the delisted firm during the pre-M&A delisting period, 
and (2) those who never followed the delisted firm. For this analysis, we match analyst data from IBES with the 
672,386 merger-peer-quarter data described in Panel B of Table 2. Including only analysts who follow a peer at least 
three times during pre-merger and post-merger periods, respectively, the final sample consists of 1,250,177 merger-
peer-analyst-quarter observations with available control variables. ForecastErr_Analyst is defined as the absolute 
value of the difference between actual EPS from IBES and individual analysts’ last forecasts that are released a quarter 
ahead of the fiscal quarter-end, scaled by the share price at the beginning of the quarter. AnalystDelisted is coded one 
if an analyst released at least one forecast for a delisted firm during the pre-M&A delisting period; zero otherwise. 
The rest of the variables used are the same as those used in our main analysis and are defined in the endnotes of Table 
4. Data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Significance levels are based upon two-tailed p-values; 10%, 5%, 
and 1% are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively 
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TABLE 7 
Exploring Two Possible Channels, Real versus Information Effects: Private vs. Public Target Firms  
 Dep. var. = ForecastErr (%)  Dep. var. = Dispersion (%) 
 Coeff. t-stat.  Coeff. t-stat. 
PostMerger 0.049*** (6.01)  0.012*** (3.62) 
PostMerger×PublicTarget 0.023** (2.35)  0.008** (2.14) 
Control variables:      
log(avgDays) 0.199*** (24.35)  -0.000 (-0.05) 
log(Coverage) 0.033*** (3.59)  0.062*** (17.47) 
log(MktValq-1) -0.826*** (-57.91)  -0.429*** (-71.44) 
log(MTB) 0.001 (0.05)  -0.030*** (-4.71) 
log(Volume) 0.520*** (17.49)  0.291*** (27.10) 
IndRet -0.262*** (-11.90)  -0.093*** (-10.79) 
Firm fixed effect Merger-peer  Merger-peer 
Time fixed effect Year  Year 
Adjusted std. error Merger-peer  Merger-peer 
Adjusted R2 13.52%  22.41% 
# of observations 241,405  241,405 
This table presents the results of an analysis of a comparison of the changes in ForecastErr and Dispersion for 
industry peer firms around M&As in the same industry involving private vs. public target firms. We merge our main 
sample of data for mergers of public firms (i.e., M&A delistings) with data for mergers of private firms. We use data 
on private-target mergers from SDC. Since SDC includes only SIC and not GICS codes for private targets, for this 
analysis we identify industry peers using two-digit SIC codes. In addition to data requirements for the public target 
sample, we also require the availability of deal value and the percentage of shares acquired data for private target 
firms. Private-targets merged around a public-target merger (6 months beginning from the public-target’s last quarterly 
report balance sheet date) are excluded, to eliminate confounding effects arising from both public- and private-targets. 
To make the private and public target firms roughly comparable by size, we only use private target firms for which 
(1) estimated firm value (=deal value/the percentage of shares acquired) is equal to or greater than the minimum 
market value of all public targets over the sample period, when both firms’ values are adjusted for the price rate, and 
(2) industry is included in the final public target sample. Likewise, we only use public target firms for which (1) firm 
value is equal to or smaller than the maximum of the estimated firm values (=deal value/the percentage of shares 
acquired) of all private targets over the sample period, and (2) industry is included in the final private target sample. 
All variables are the same as those used in our main analysis and are defined in the endnotes of Table 4. Data are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Significance levels are based upon two-tailed p-values; 10%, 5%, and 1% are 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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TABLE 8 
Further Analyses: Horizontal vs. Conglomerate Mergers 
 Full Sample  Reduced Sample 
 
Dep. var. 
=ForecastErr (%) 
Dep. var. 
=Dispersion (%) 
 
Dep. var. 
=ForecastErr (%) 
Dep. var. 
=Dispersion (%) 
PostMerger 0.083*** 0.018***  0.132*** 0.039*** 
 (5.90) (3.67)  (6.26) (5.15) 
PostMerger×HMerger 0.107*** 0.031***  0.091*** 0.023*** 
 (7.46) (5.97)  (4.20) (2.94) 
Control variables:      
log(avgDays) 0.235*** ‒0.025***  0.238*** ‒0.030*** 
 (16.98) (‒5.12)  (10.98) (‒3.90) 
log(Coverage) 0.096*** 0.092***  0.069*** 0.078*** 
 (7.81) (20.43)  (3.62) (11.06) 
log(MktValq‒1) ‒1.082*** ‒0.470***  ‒1.077*** ‒0.460*** 
 (‒54.09) (‒63.80)  (‒36.30) (‒42.24) 
log(MTB) 0.054*** 0.010  0.046* 0.002 
 (3.05) (1.41)  (1.68) (0.22) 
log(Volume) 0.747*** 0.380***  0.719*** 0.374*** 
 (19.88) (28.34)  (12.60) (17.80) 
IndRet ‒0.396*** ‒0.106***  ‒0.424*** ‒0.131*** 
 (‒13.20) (‒11.14)  (‒9.39) (‒8.87) 
Firm fixed effect Merger-peer Merger-peer  Merger-peer Merger-peer 
Time fixed effect Year Year  Year Year 
Adjusted std. error Merger-peer Merger-peer  Merger-peer Merger-peer 
Adjusted R2 13.79% 20.64%  15.23% 21.57% 
# of observations 226,134 226,134  96,160 96,160 
This table presents a comparison of horizontal with conglomerate mergers. Horizontal (conglomerate) mergers 
are mergers in which the acquirer and target firm are in the same (different) industry (8 digit GICS code). HMerger is 
coded one if the eight-digit GICS code of the acquirer is the same as that of the target; 0 otherwise. If there are multiple 
mergers in an industry-quarter with mixed HMerger values, we exclude that industry-quarter from the sample; 
therefore, the sample in this analysis is composed of industry-years with either horizontal or conglomerate merger(s) 
(and not both). The rest of the variables are the same as those used in our main analysis and are defined in the endnotes 
of Table 4. Standard errors are adjusted clustering by each merger-peer. Data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
Significance levels are based upon two-tailed p-values; 10%, 5%, and 1% are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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TABLE 9 
Ruling out Alternatives: Changes in Industry Peer Firms’ Voluntary Disclosures 
 Full Sample  Reduced Sample 
 Coeff. t-stat.  Coeff. t-stat. 
PostMerger 0.006** (2.00)  0.006 (1.22) 
Control variables:      
log(Issue) –0.010 (–0.84)  0.015 (0.85) 
log(MTB) –0.051*** (–12.04)  –0.036*** (–5.44) 
RetVol 0.120 (1.48)  0.505*** (3.79) 
log(Coverage) 0.085*** (26.14)  0.091*** (17.22) 
log(MktValq‒1) 0.062*** (21.09)  0.081*** (17.02) 
IndRet 0.061*** (9.88)  0.065*** (6.43) 
Firm fixed effect Merger-peer  Merger-peer 
Time fixed effect Year  Year 
Adjusted std. error Merger-peer  Merger-peer 
Adjusted R2 6.55%  7.84% 
# of observations 361,048  142,922 
This table presents the results of an analysis of changes in the frequency with which industry peer firms provide 
management forecasts (MForeFreq) across the pre- and post-M&A delisting periods. The analysis includes fixed 
effects for each M&A delisting-industry peer firm pair, along with year fixed effects. We begin the sample selection 
with the 672,368 merger-peer-quarters described in Panel B of Table 2, which is merged with management forecast 
data from IBES/FirstCall. Management forecast observations released over the current quarter are counted and defined 
as Management Forecast Frequency. All merger-peers that contain fewer than two observations in each of pre-merger 
and post-merger periods are excluded. The control variables are: log(Issue), log(MTB), RetVol, log(Coverage), and 
log(MktValq-1) and IndRet are used. Issue is defined as the sum of net equity issuance and debt issuance (Compustat 
variables (SSTKQ- PRSTKCQ + DLTISQ)/ATQ). RetVol is the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the 
quarter. The rest of the variables are the same as those used in our main analysis and are defined in the endnotes of 
Table 4. Standard errors are adjusted clustering by each merger-peer. Data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
Significance levels are based upon two-tailed p-values; 10%, 5%, and 1% are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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TABLE 10 
Robustness Test: Other Overlapping M&A Delistings in the Same Industry 
 Full Sample  Reduced Sample 
 Dep. var. = ForecastErr (%) Dep. var. = Dispersion (%)  Dep. var. = ForecastErr (%) Dep. var. = Dispersion (%) 
PostMerger 0.124*** 0.104*** 0.031*** 0.028***  0.118*** 0.095*** 0.039*** 0.033*** 
 (8.87) (7.10) (6.23) (5.35)  (5.65) (4.30) (5.24) (4.23) 
PostMerger×CMS  1.402***  0.268**   1.703***  0.449** 
  (4.29)  (2.31)   (3.34)  (2.57) 
PreMergerOverlap 0.014 0.009 0.005 0.005  -0.030* -0.035** -0.001 -0.002 
 (1.37) (0.88) (1.42) (1.20)  (–1.84) (–2.15) (–0.17) (–0.40) 
PostMergerOverlap 0.054*** 0.058*** 0.009** 0.010***  0.077*** 0.082*** 0.012** 0.013** 
 (5.20) (5.51) (2.50) (2.64)  (4.72) (4.97) (1.97) (2.17) 
Control variables:          
log(avgDays) 0.247*** 0.248*** –0.032*** –0.032***  0.261*** 0.261*** –0.029*** –0.029*** 
 (19.24) (19.24) (–6.98) (–6.96)  (12.44) (12.43) (–4.00) (–4.01) 
log(Coverage) 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.094*** 0.094***  0.084*** 0.085*** 0.089*** 0.089*** 
 (8.31) (8.30) (22.78) (22.73)  (4.65) (4.66) (13.26) (13.27) 
log(MktValq–1) –1.095*** –1.097*** –0.466*** –0.467***  –1.127*** –1.128*** –0.476*** –0.476*** 
 (–61.63) (–61.63) (–71.65) (–71.66)  (–40.99) (–41.00) (–47.41) (–47.41) 
log(MTB) 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.010* 0.010*  0.061** 0.061** –0.000 –0.000 
 (4.07) (4.05) (1.67) (1.65)  (2.38) (2.38) (–0.01) (–0.01) 
log(Volume) 0.805*** 0.808*** 0.397*** 0.398***  0.814*** 0.811*** 0.393*** 0.392*** 
 (22.80) (22.82) (33.03) (33.04)  (14.98) (14.97) (20.45) (20.44) 
IndRet –0.458*** –0.459*** –0.129*** –0.129***  –0.506*** –0.504*** –0.157*** –0.157*** 
 (–16.44) (–16.45) (–14.48) (–14.50)  (–11.48) (–11.46) (–11.01) (–10.99) 
Firm fixed effect Merger-peer Merger-peer Merger-peer Merger-peer  Merger-peer Merger-peer Merger-peer Merger-peer 
Time fixed effect Year Year Year Year  Year Year Year Year 
Adjusted std. error Merger-peer Merger-peer Merger-peer Merger-peer  Merger-peer Merger-peer Merger-peer Merger-peer 
Adjusted R2 14.28% 14.32% 20.76% 20.80%  15.95% 15.97% 22.02% 22.03% 
# of observations 273,920 272,665 273,920 272,665  110,564 110,564 110,564 110,564 
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This table presents a robustness test of our main analyses in Table 4 in which we include fixed effects to control for the presence (absence) of other M&A 
delistings in the same industry in either the pre- or post-M&A delisting periods, using two indicator variables PreMergerOverlap and PostMergerOverlap. 
Specifically, if another peer firm stops disclosing financial reports because it is merged-and-delisted during the pre-merger (post-merger) period of [q-6, −q-1] 
([q+2, q+7]), then PreMergerOverlap (PostMergerOverlap) is coded one for the merger-peer-quarter observation and the merger-peer’s subsequent quarters during 
the pre-merger (post-merger) period; zero otherwise. Of the 136,149 (137,771) pre-merger (post-merger) firm-quarter observations for industry peer firms, 99,900 
(100,541) observations have PreMergerOverlap = 1 (PostMergerOverlap = 1). The rest of the variables are the same as those used in our main analysis and are 
defined in the endnotes of Table 4. Standard errors are adjusted clustering by each merger-peer. Data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Significance levels 
are based upon two-tailed p-values; 10%, 5%, and 1% are indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
